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Security audit

Knowledge Graph - Rest Api Wrapper Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent graph REST API scaffold, but it overstates production security readiness for powerful query and data-mutation APIs.

Install only if you treat this as a scaffold/reference, not a production-ready API generator. Before deploying anything based on it, add real authentication and authorization enforcement, parameterized or allowlisted graph queries, destructive-action controls, webhook URL validation, rate limiting, audit logging, least-privilege database credentials, and pinned dependencies.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
examples/rest-api-examples.md:237
Finding

Cypher Injection Through Direct Interpolation of Request Parameters

Content
View full analysis
(c:Category {{id:'{category}'}})") if min_price > 0 or max_price < 999999: price_filter = f"p.price >= {min_price} AND p.price <= {max_price}" filters.append(f"WHERE {price_filter}") where_clause = " ".join(filters) if filters else "" order_by = f"ORDER BY p.{sort.lstrip('-')}" + (" DESC" if sort.startswith("-") else "") full_query = f""" {query} {where_clause} {order_by} SKIP {offset} LIMIT {limit} """ products = db.execute_query(full_query) ``` ```python query = f""" MATCH (p:Product {{id:'{product_id}'}})-[:PURCHASED_WITH]-(rec:Product) WITH rec, COUNT(*) as frequency ORDER BY frequency DESC LIMIT {limit} RETURN rec """ recommendations = db.execute_query(query) ``` ### Technical Analysis The examples insert HTTP request parameters directly into Cypher statements using Python formatted strings. The affected values include: - `user_id`, originating from a URL path parameter. - `category`, originating from a query parameter. - `sort`, originating from a query parameter an ...[truncated 2292 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:24
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (19)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill repeatedly presents itself as 'production-ready' and claims security features like authentication, authorization, validation, rate limiting, and server startup, while the described implementation apparently only stores configuration or logs descriptors. This can mislead users into deploying generated output under a false sense of security, resulting in exposed graph data, weak access control, or unsafe API surfaces.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

md
GET    /api/v1/nodes/{id}            - Get specific node
POST   /api/v1/nodes                 - Create new node
PUT    /api/v1/nodes/{id}            - Update node
DELETE /api/v1/nodes/{id}            - Delete node

GET    /api/v1/relationships         - List relationships
POST   /api/v1/relationships         - Create relationship

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

md
GET    /api/v1/relationships         - List relationships
POST   /api/v1/relationships         - Create relationship
DELETE /api/v1/relationships/{id}    - Delete relationship

POST   /api/v1/query                 - Execute query
GET    /api/v1/nodes/{id}/neighbors  - Get connected nodes

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 233)May include surrounding context.

Request:

http
DELETE /api/v1/nodes/n1

Response (204 No Content)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/rest-api-patterns.md (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

Request:

http
DELETE /api/v1/nodes/n1

Response (204 No Content)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/rest-api-patterns.md (reported line 372)May include surrounding context.

Request:

http
DELETE /api/v1/relationships/r1

Response (204 No Content)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly promotes query execution endpoints and CRUD-style graph data operations but does not warn that exposing custom query execution and data-modifying endpoints can enable unauthorized data access, arbitrary graph mutation, or destructive operations if generated APIs are deployed with weak controls. In this skill’s context, the omission is more dangerous because it is positioned as a production-ready generator for graph databases, which may encourage users to expose powerful backend capabilities directly over HTTP.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages exposing node and relationship creation, update, and deletion operations over REST without warning about destructive consequences, authorization requirements, backups, or least-privilege design. In graph-database contexts, these endpoints can enable irreversible data corruption or broad integrity loss if generated or used carelessly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Documenting custom query execution and webhook capabilities without privacy, SSRF, egress-control, or integrity warnings is risky because these features are powerful and commonly abused. Arbitrary query endpoints can expose or modify sensitive graph data, and webhook callbacks can be used to exfiltrate data or reach internal services if implemented naively.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents a social-network API that creates user accounts, stores emails, profiles, friendships, follows, and exposes recommendation and graph-traversal endpoints. Under SQP-2 for markdown files, descriptions that affect user data or privacy should include warnings, but this section presents these operations as production-ready examples without any user-facing caution about personal-data handling or privacy implications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/rest-api-examples.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

Base URL

text
https://api.socialnetwork.com/v1

Authentication

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/rest-api-examples.md (reported line 279)May include surrounding context.

Base URL

text
https://api.ecommerce.com/v1

Product Endpoints

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The document asserts that all examples use best practices, proper authentication, and error handling, but the included FastAPI examples do not actually enforce authentication and build graph queries with direct string interpolation. This mismatch can cause developers to trust and reuse insecure example code in production, leading to authorization gaps and query-injection vulnerabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents resource deletion via DELETE /api/v1/nodes/n1 as a normal pattern, but it does not include any warning about irreversible data loss, confirmation requirements, or recovery considerations. Because SQP-2 applies to markdown files, destructive behaviors that could affect user data should be accompanied by clear warnings.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The file presents itself as a production-ready REST API wrapper generator, but it does not generate executable route handlers, connect to a real database client, or launch an actual server. This is dangerous because consumers may deploy or rely on it in security-sensitive environments believing they have a hardened API layer, when key protections and runtime behavior are absent, creating a false sense of security around exposed graph operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The module advertises authentication support, but enable_authentication() only toggles configuration flags and no request handling, credential validation, token verification, or per-endpoint enforcement exists. In a skill that claims to generate production-ready REST wrappers for graph database operations, this can lead operators to expose sensitive query and data-management endpoints under the false assumption that access control is active.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The code claims rate limiting as a feature, but enable_rate_limiting() only stores numeric settings in config and never applies throttling to requests. In the context of graph database query and traversal endpoints, missing rate limiting increases exposure to denial-of-service, resource exhaustion, and abuse through expensive or repeated queries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The file presents DELETE /api/v1/relationships/r1 as a standard pattern but does not warn that removing edges can alter graph integrity, downstream behavior, or analytics results. For markdown documentation, SQP-2 expects disclosure when described behavior can affect user data or system integrity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.