T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:28- Finding
Unpinned Installer and Mutable Remote Repository Create a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md, lines 28–30
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party installer and mutable remote dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code:
bash npx skills add https://github.com/finskills/value-dividend-screener --skill value-dividend-screenerTechnical Analysis
The documented installation command invokes
npx skillswithout specifying an exact package version or integrity value. Depending on the local npm configuration and cache state,npxcan retrieve and execute the currently published version of theskillspackage. Consequently, the code executed during installation may differ from the version reviewed by users or auditors.The command also references a GitHub repository without pinning it to a specific commit hash or immutable release artifact. The repository content retrieved during installation can therefore change after the skill has been reviewed. This creates two mutable supply-chain boundaries:
- The npm package executed by
npx. - The GitHub repository consumed by that installer.
If either source is compromised, replaced, or maliciously updated, the installation process may execute or install attacker-controlled content. The project itself contains no executable source files, and the audit found no evidence that the currently documented repository or package is malicious; the finding concerns the unsafe, unpinned installation mechanism.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package distribution channel, GitHub account, or upstream repository.
- The attacker publishes a modified installer package or changes the repository content.
- A user follows the documented installation command.
npxdownloads and executes the changed package, which then retrieves mutable repository content.- Attacker-controlled installer logic executes under the privileges of the user running the command, or malicious ...[truncated 737 chars]
- The npm package executed by
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the npm installer to an exact, reviewed version rather than relying on the latest published package:
bash npx --yes skills@<exact-reviewed-version> add ... - Reference the skill repository by a full, reviewed commit hash or an immutable signed release rather than its mutable default branch.
- Publish and verify cryptographic checksums for downloaded release artifacts.
- Prefer packages from a verified, scoped npm publisher and document how users can confirm package ownership and provenance.
- Use npm provenance attestations or equivalent signed supply-chain metadata where available.
- Avoid running the installer with administrator or root privileges. Execute it in a restricted account, container, or sandbox with only the filesystem and network access required for installation.
- Add dependency update controls so that version changes require explicit review, testing, and a new security assessment.
- Keep the README version, skill metadata version, repository release, and pinned installer version synchronized to make the reviewed artifact unambiguous.
- Pin the npm installer to an exact, reviewed version rather than relying on the latest published package:
