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Security audit

value-dividend-screener

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent financial screening skill that uses a disclosed Finskills API key and documented market-data endpoints, with a supply-chain caution around its unpinned README install command.

Install from a reviewed commit or release if possible, avoid running the installer with elevated privileges, and understand that the skill will send stock symbols and requests to Finskills using your API key.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:28
Finding

Unpinned Installer and Mutable Remote Repository Create a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: README.md, lines 28–30
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party installer and mutable remote dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
npx skills add https://github.com/finskills/value-dividend-screener --skill value-dividend-screener

Technical Analysis

The documented installation command invokes npx skills without specifying an exact package version or integrity value. Depending on the local npm configuration and cache state, npx can retrieve and execute the currently published version of the skills package. Consequently, the code executed during installation may differ from the version reviewed by users or auditors.

The command also references a GitHub repository without pinning it to a specific commit hash or immutable release artifact. The repository content retrieved during installation can therefore change after the skill has been reviewed. This creates two mutable supply-chain boundaries:

  1. The npm package executed by npx.
  2. The GitHub repository consumed by that installer.

If either source is compromised, replaced, or maliciously updated, the installation process may execute or install attacker-controlled content. The project itself contains no executable source files, and the audit found no evidence that the currently documented repository or package is malicious; the finding concerns the unsafe, unpinned installation mechanism.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package distribution channel, GitHub account, or upstream repository.
  2. The attacker publishes a modified installer package or changes the repository content.
  3. A user follows the documented installation command.
  4. npx downloads and executes the changed package, which then retrieves mutable repository content.
  5. Attacker-controlled installer logic executes under the privileges of the user running the command, or malicious ...[truncated 737 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the npm installer to an exact, reviewed version rather than relying on the latest published package:
    bash
    npx --yes skills@<exact-reviewed-version> add ...
    
  2. Reference the skill repository by a full, reviewed commit hash or an immutable signed release rather than its mutable default branch.
  3. Publish and verify cryptographic checksums for downloaded release artifacts.
  4. Prefer packages from a verified, scoped npm publisher and document how users can confirm package ownership and provenance.
  5. Use npm provenance attestations or equivalent signed supply-chain metadata where available.
  6. Avoid running the installer with administrator or root privileges. Execute it in a restricted account, container, or sandbox with only the filesystem and network access required for installation.
  7. Add dependency update controls so that version changes require explicit review, testing, and a new security assessment.
  8. Keep the README version, skill metadata version, repository release, and pinned installer version synchronized to make the reviewed artifact unambiguous.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to install and run a remote skill via npx skills add without pinning a specific version or immutable artifact. If the skills package or its dependency resolution is compromised or updated maliciously, users may execute unintended code during installation, and README-driven install commands are a common supply-chain attack path.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.