Back to skill

Security audit

us-stock-analyzer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward stock-analysis helper that uses a disclosed third-party market-data API and does not show hidden, destructive, or persistence behavior.

Install only from a source and version you trust, provide a Finskills API key only if you are comfortable with Finskills receiving requested ticker symbols and related query parameters, and treat generated ratings and price targets as research rather than financial advice.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:22
Finding

Unpinned Package Execution in Installation Command

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: README.md, lines 22–26
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package execution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

bash
## Install

```bash
npx skills add https://github.com/finskills/us-stock-analyzer
text

### Technical Analysis

The installation instructions invoke `npx skills` without specifying a reviewed package version or integrity hash. When the package is not already available locally, `npx` can retrieve the currently resolved version of the `skills` package from the configured package registry and execute its command-line entry point.

Consequently, the code executed by this instruction is not fully determined by the audited repository. Its behavior can change after the skill has been reviewed. The command also directs the installer to retrieve content from a mutable Git repository without pinning a commit hash or immutable release artifact.

This creates a supply-chain exposure in which compromise of the registry package, its publisher account, the configured package registry, or the referenced repository could result in execution of code that was not included in this audit.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the publisher account, distribution channel, or repository associated with one of the dynamically retrieved components.
2. The attacker publishes or introduces a malicious version while retaining the expected package or repository name.
3. A user follows the documented installation instructions and runs:
   ```bash
   npx skills add https://github.com/finskills/us-stock-analyzer
  1. npx resolves and executes the unpinned package version.
  2. The malicious installer code runs with the privileges of the user who launched the command.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. Depending on that account's privileges and environment, an attacker could access user-readable files and creden ...[truncated 416 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the installer package to an explicitly reviewed version:
    bash
    npx --yes skills@<reviewed-version> add <source>
    
  2. Pin the skill source to an immutable commit hash or signed release rather than a mutable repository branch.
  3. Publish and verify cryptographic checksums or signatures for installation artifacts.
  4. Document the expected package publisher and registry so users can verify package provenance before execution.
  5. Use a lockfile or similarly reproducible dependency mechanism where supported.
  6. Recommend installation from a non-privileged account and warn users not to expose unrelated CI or developer credentials during installation.
  7. Re-audit installer behavior whenever the pinned package version or source commit is updated.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to install the skill directly from a GitHub URL via npx skills add without any version pinning or immutable reference. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the upstream repository is later changed, compromised, or force-pushed, future installs may fetch different code than what was originally reviewed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs sending user-supplied ticker requests and an API key to a third-party service, but does not require a clear user-facing disclosure that data will be shared externally. Even if the ticker itself is low sensitivity, the undisclosed transfer of user queries to an outside provider creates a privacy and transparency risk and can surprise users about where their requests are processed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The activation conditions are broad enough to match many ordinary investing questions, which can cause the skill to trigger without the user clearly intending to use an external stock-analysis workflow. That increases the chance of unnecessary external data access and overreach into financial-opinion generation, especially in ambiguous conversations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.