T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party MCP Package Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 27–29
Vulnerability Type:T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet
markdown 1. You need the Fidacy MCP server (`npx -y @fidacy/mcp`) with an engine API key (free at https://app.fidacy.com/signup, scope assess:write).Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs users to run
npx -y @fidacy/mcpwithout specifying an immutable package version or integrity hash. The-yoption suppresses interactive confirmation, while the absence of a version causes package resolution to depend on the npm registry state at execution time.The project does not include the MCP server implementation, a package lockfile, vendored source, or integrity metadata. Consequently, the code executed by this instruction may differ from the code originally reviewed. The documentation claims that files are hashed locally and that only SHA-256 digests are submitted, but this behavior cannot be verified from the supplied project.
This creates a supply-chain trust boundary: compromise of the package, its publisher account, its dependency graph, or the relevant registry response could result in arbitrary code running with the invoking process's permissions.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the
@fidacy/mcppackage, its publisher account, or a transitive dependency and publishes a malicious release. - A user follows the Skill's instruction and executes
npx -y @fidacy/mcp. - npm resolves and downloads the unpinned package release.
npxexecutes the downloaded package without requesting confirmation.- The malicious package runs with the user's or Agent's local privileges.
- It may access the supplied Fidacy API key, artifact paths and readable files, misuse available credentials, transmit data, or execute additional commands.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide code execution under the account running
npx. The practical scope inclu ...[truncated 571 chars]- An attacker compromises the
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the MCP package to an exact, reviewed version rather than resolving the latest release:
bash npx --yes @fidacy/mcp@<exact-reviewed-version> - Verify the package's registry provenance and integrity before execution. Publish and validate expected package checksums or signatures.
- Include a lockfile or vendor the auditable MCP implementation and its dependency metadata with the Skill.
- Avoid suppressing confirmation with
-yin security-sensitive setup instructions unless execution is otherwise verified and controlled. - Run the MCP server in a sandbox with narrowly scoped filesystem access, restricted outbound networking, and no unnecessary environment variables or credentials.
- Provide the API key only to the MCP process, use the minimum required scope, and support short-lived or revocable credentials.
- Document and enforce the exact network destinations and request fields used during anchoring.
- Independently verify through tests or inspectable source that artifact contents remain local and only the intended SHA-256 digest and necessary metadata are transmitted.
- Pin the MCP package to an exact, reviewed version rather than resolving the latest release:
