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Security audit

Twitter API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a read-only Twitter/X data access skill that clearly points to an external paid API, with privacy and spending cautions users should understand before use.

Install only if you are comfortable sending Twitter/X searches, account identifiers, tweet IDs, list IDs, and related metadata to twitter.fetcher.sh and paying per request. Use a scoped Fetcher key, avoid confidential investigations or regulated data unless approved, and set agent controls around paid MCP actions such as credit top-up.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill directs users to send search queries, handles, tweet IDs, list IDs, and other identifiers to a third-party service but does not warn that these inputs leave the local agent context and are transmitted to an external provider. This can cause inadvertent disclosure of sensitive investigative terms, private identifiers, or proprietary monitoring targets, especially because the skill is positioned as a convenient drop-in API and may be used automatically by agents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The examples instruct users to send authenticated requests containing search queries, account lookups, and potentially sensitive investigative targets to a third-party API, but they do not disclose that this data leaves the local environment and is visible to the service operator. In a security or monitoring context, undisclosed transmission can expose research intent, targets, or internal workflows, and the embedded bearer-token pattern also increases the chance of accidental credential use without adequate caution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
references/scenarios.md:11

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:78