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Security audit

Mobazha Tor Browsing

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly privacy setup documentation, but it tells users to run an unverified remote installer with root privileges.

Install only if you trust Mobazha's installer infrastructure. Prefer dashboard-based configuration or a versioned, signed, checksum-verified installer instead of running `curl | sudo bash` as root.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:55
Finding

Unverified Tor Installer Is Downloaded and Executed as Root

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 55
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and privileged execution
Risk Level: Critical

Vulnerable Code:

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay tor

Technical Analysis

The documented installation command retrieves a mutable script from an external URL and pipes it directly into sudo bash. The downloaded content is not pinned to an immutable version and is not inspected or validated through a cryptographic signature or checksum before execution.

Because the remote response is executed with root privileges, the effective payload can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the hosting server, domain, DNS path, TLS endpoint, or release infrastructure could therefore turn this installation command into an arbitrary privileged-code-execution mechanism.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote script distribution infrastructure for get.mobazha.org.
  2. The attacker modifies the response served from /standalone to include malicious shell commands.
  3. A user or agent follows the Tor installation instruction in the Skill.
  4. curl downloads the attacker-controlled response.
  5. The shell pipeline passes the response directly to sudo bash.
  6. The malicious commands execute with root privileges without prior integrity verification or review.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution as root on the installation host. An attacker could access or alter system and application data, steal credentials and secrets, modify containers or services, install persistence, disable security controls, pivot to reachable systems, or destroy data. The potential scope includes the entire host and any resources accessible through its credentials or network trust relationships.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

Replace the pipe-to-shell installation flow with a verifiable release process:

  1. Publish versioned installer artifacts through an official release channel.
  2. Pin the documentation to an immutable release version rather than a mutable endpoint.
  3. Publish a cryptographic signature and a strong checksum, such as SHA-256, through a separately secured channel.
  4. Require users to download the artifact to a local file and verify its signature and checksum before execution.
  5. Allow users to inspect the downloaded script before running it.
  6. Avoid running the entire installer as root. Use an unprivileged account and elevate only narrowly scoped operations that require administrative access.
  7. Configure curl to fail on HTTP errors and enforce modern HTTPS behavior, but do not treat transport security as a substitute for artifact verification.
  8. Document the files, services, containers, and permissions modified by the installer so its privileged effects can be audited.

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:103
Finding

Unverified Lokinet Installer Is Downloaded and Executed as Root

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 103
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and privileged execution
Risk Level: Critical

Vulnerable Code:

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay lokinet

Technical Analysis

The Lokinet installation instruction downloads shell content from a mutable external endpoint and immediately executes it using sudo bash. It does not pin an immutable release or require checksum or signature verification. Consequently, the code that runs on a user's system is controlled by the remote endpoint at execution time rather than by the reviewed contents of this Skill.

Although HTTPS protects the connection under normal conditions, it does not establish the integrity of a specific software release if the distribution server, domain, certificate environment, or release pipeline is compromised. Executing the response through sudo bash gives every command in that response root privileges.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the server, domain, or release pipeline serving https://get.mobazha.org/standalone.
  2. The attacker replaces or modifies the installer response with a malicious shell payload.
  3. A user or agent runs the documented Lokinet installation command.
  4. curl retrieves the modified payload and writes it to the shell pipeline.
  5. sudo bash executes the payload as root.
  6. The attacker obtains control over the host within the authority available to the root account.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation can result in complete host compromise. The malicious installer could read credentials, private keys, configuration, databases, and application secrets; modify or replace system services and containers; establish persistent access; exfiltrate sensitive information; manipulate network traffic; or erase data. Compromise may extend to other systems accessible using credentials or trust relatio ...[truncated 36 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

Remove direct remote-to-root shell execution and adopt a signed, versioned installation process:

  1. Distribute the Lokinet installer as an immutable, versioned artifact.
  2. Pin the documented command to a specific audited release.
  3. Provide cryptographic signatures and checksums, with verification instructions that fail closed.
  4. Download the installer to disk before execution so it can be inspected and audited.
  5. Execute the installer without root privileges by default and use narrowly scoped privilege elevation only where required.
  6. Secure the release pipeline with protected publishing credentials, multi-party release approval, and auditable build provenance.
  7. Clearly disclose all privileged changes made by the installer and provide rollback or uninstall instructions.
  8. Consider using a trusted package repository with signed metadata instead of a shell installer endpoint.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (8)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill fetches a script from an external URL and executes it immediately with root privileges, eliminating any opportunity for review or integrity validation. In a privacy/anonymity skill, this is especially dangerous because users may assume they are improving security while actually opening a high-trust remote code execution path on their host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

Option 1: Enable During Docker Installation

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay tor

This sets up your store with a .onion address. No domain name or public IP required.

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The pipeline chains network retrieval directly into privileged shell execution, which is a classic abuse pattern because it combines two high-risk operations into a single opaque command. This removes inspection points and makes accidental or malicious execution of harmful payloads much more likely.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

Option 1: Enable During Docker Installation

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay tor

This sets up your store with a .onion address. No domain name or public IP required.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

bash
cd /opt/mobazha
# Update .env to set OVERLAY_TYPE=tor and CONNECTIVITY=overlay
# Then restart:
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.overlay.yml --profile tor up -d

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This is another instance of unverified external script fetching followed by privileged execution. The convenience of a one-liner materially increases risk because it normalizes blind trust in remote code at the exact point where the script gains full system control.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

Mobazha also supports Lokinet as a privacy overlay:

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay lokinet

Lokinet provides similar anonymity properties with potentially lower latency.

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This chained command has the same risk profile as the Tor overlay variant: remote content is streamed straight into a root shell. The command structure itself is the problem, independent of whether the requested overlay is Tor or Lokinet.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

Mobazha also supports Lokinet as a privacy overlay:

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay lokinet

Lokinet provides similar anonymity properties with potentially lower latency.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
|----------|---------------|
| Windows | Download and run the installer from torproject.org |
| macOS | Download the `.dmg`, drag to Applications |
| Linux | `sudo apt install torbrowser-launcher` or download from torproject.org |
| Android | Install "Tor Browser" from Google Play or F-Droid |

### Step 2: Access a .onion Store

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to pipe a remotely fetched script directly into sudo bash, granting root execution to unaudited network content. If the remote endpoint is compromised, tampered with, or serves unexpected content, this becomes immediate arbitrary code execution as root.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

Option 1: Enable During Docker Installation

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay tor

This sets up your store with a .onion address. No domain name or public IP required.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This repeats the same dangerous pattern of fetching remote content and executing it with sudo bash. The Lokinet overlay parameter does not reduce the risk; a compromised installer or MITM-adjacent delivery issue would still result in root-level code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

Mobazha also supports Lokinet as a privacy overlay:

bash
curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay lokinet

Lokinet provides similar anonymity properties with potentially lower latency.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.