Subdomain Bot Config

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 6:58 AM UTC
• Version: 0.2.0

Overview

The skill is a coherent setup guide, but it tells users to run an unverified internet-downloaded installer with root privileges.

Install only if you trust Mobazha's installer distribution path and are comfortable granting it root access to the server. Prefer a version-pinned installer with published checksums or signatures, inspect it before running, and use a non-production host or backup/rollback plan where possible. Keep BotFather tokens private and provide them only to the intended store admin configuration flow.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:20

Finding

Unverified Remote Installer Executed with Root Privileges

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 20
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Critical

Complete Code Snippet:

bash

curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --domain shop.example.com

Technical Analysis

The installation instruction retrieves a mutable script from an external URL and pipes it directly into bash under sudo. The downloaded payload is executed without version pinning, cryptographic signature or checksum verification, or an opportunity for local inspection.

HTTPS protects the connection in transit but does not make the hosted payload immutable or protect users if the hosting service, publishing process, domain, or associated infrastructure is compromised. Because curl writes directly to the shell, any commands supplied by the remote endpoint receive root-level execution immediately.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the remote installer endpoint, its publishing pipeline, or infrastructure capable of controlling the response.
2. The endpoint is modified to return attacker-controlled shell commands.
3. A user follows the documented installation instruction.
4. curl downloads the modified response and sends it directly to sudo bash.
5. The attacker-controlled commands execute with root privileges on the user's host.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command execution as root. The effective scope includes the entire host and may allow theft of application and system credentials, access to store data, modification or destruction of files, installation of persistent services, tampering with security controls, lateral movement using credentials available on the server, and complete system takeover.

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

Replace the direct download-to-shell pipeline with a verifiable installation process:

1. Publish immutable, versioned installer artifacts rather than relying only on a mutable URL.
2. Download the selected artifact to a local file without executing it.
3. Publish a cryptographic checksum and preferably a signed release manifest through a separately authenticated release channel.
4. Verify the artifact's signature and checksum before execution, failing closed on any mismatch.
5. Allow the administrator to inspect the downloaded script before running it.
6. Execute only the operations that require elevation with sudo, rather than running the entire installer as root.
7. Document the expected artifact version, signer identity, checksum-verification commands, and rollback procedure.

A safer workflow is:

bash

curl --fail --show-error --location \
  --output mobazha-standalone-vX.Y.Z.sh \
  https://get.mobazha.org/releases/vX.Y.Z/standalone.sh

echo '<PUBLISHED_SHA256>  mobazha-standalone-vX.Y.Z.sh' | sha256sum --check -
less mobazha-standalone-vX.Y.Z.sh
sudo bash mobazha-standalone-vX.Y.Z.sh --domain shop.example.com

The placeholder checksum must be replaced with a trusted, release-specific value, and signature verification should be preferred where supported.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration

Findings (3)

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

Fetching a script from the internet and immediately executing it removes any meaningful opportunity for integrity verification or review. In this skill, the danger is amplified because the command is presented as a setup step for end users, making unsafe execution likely and turning any upstream compromise into instant code execution on customer infrastructure.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

Option 1: Set domain during installation

bash

curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --domain shop.example.com

Option 2: Add domain to an existing store

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The pipe into sudo bash is a dangerous command chain because untrusted network content flows directly into a privileged shell without validation. This pattern is especially risky in a skill intended to guide operational setup, since users may paste the command verbatim on production VPS hosts, enabling full system takeover if the remote content is altered.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

Option 1: Set domain during installation

bash

curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --domain shop.example.com

Option 2: Add domain to an existing store

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs users to execute a remote installer under sudo, which grants the fetched script full root privileges on the host. Even if the vendor is legitimate, this creates a serious supply-chain and integrity risk because any compromise of the distribution endpoint, DNS, TLS termination, or script content leads to arbitrary privileged code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

Option 1: Set domain during installation

bash

curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --domain shop.example.com

Option 2: Add domain to an existing store

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.