T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:31- Finding
Long-Lived Authentication Token Exposed in Request URLs
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This diary skill does what it says, but it sends sensitive diary content and a long-lived Feishu-linked token to an external service with limited privacy and credential-handling disclosure.
Review this carefully before installing. Use it only if you are comfortable sending diary entries, dates, AI-analysis requests, and a Feishu-linked long-lived token to image.yezishop.vip. Avoid submitting secrets or highly sensitive personal information, rotate the token if exposed, and look for privacy, retention, deletion, and AI-provider details from the service operator.
SKILL.md:31Long-Lived Authentication Token Exposed in Request URLs
SKILL.md:27Private Diary Content Transmitted to an External Service Without Adequate Privacy Disclosure
The skill instructs users to send diary content and a token-authenticated request to a third-party remote service without a prominent privacy warning or data-handling disclosure. Because diary entries are inherently sensitive personal data, users may unknowingly transmit private information off-platform, creating confidentiality and consent risk even if the transmission is the intended function.
This command explicitly transmits diary contents and an account-linked token to an external internet service. External transmission is expected for this skill, but it is still security-relevant because highly sensitive personal content is leaving the local environment and the token is embedded in the request URL, which can increase exposure through logs, history, or intermediaries.
When the user wants to save or push a diary entry for a specific date:
curl -s -X POST "https://image.yezishop.vip/api/diary-hook/$AI_DIARY_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"date\": \"$DATE\", \"content\": \"$CONTENT\"}" | jq .
The analysis feature sends stored diary content to an AI-powered endpoint but does not clearly warn users that sensitive personal writings will be processed by AI. This creates a meaningful privacy risk because users may expect local retrieval or simple metadata processing, not secondary analysis of intimate content by an external model-backed service.
The skill's manifest name and heading are presented only in Chinese, while the rest of the description is in English, with no indication that the skill is intentionally region-specific or that users may choose their preferred language. This can conflict with language/locale policy expectations when a skill imposes a language without opt-in.
No suspicious patterns detected.