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Security audit

TTS

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This TTS skill is a straightforward hosted text-to-speech integration, but users should avoid sending sensitive text because content is transmitted to a third-party service.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the text you synthesize to tts.102465.xyz. Prefer POST over GET, avoid passwords, keys, private business data, regulated personal data, or confidential scripts, and delete generated MP3 files when they are no longer needed.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:29
Finding

Sensitive User Text Disclosed to an Undocumented Third-Party TTS Service and Embedded in URLs

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill directs users to send arbitrary user-provided text to a third-party hosted TTS service, but it does not require any disclosure or confirmation that the text will leave the local environment. This creates a real privacy and data-handling risk, especially if users provide sensitive, proprietary, or regulated content assuming the conversion is local.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This is a genuine external transmission path: the example POST sends text content directly to a remote domain for processing. In the context of a TTS skill this is functionally necessary, but it is still security-relevant because any sensitive text included in the request is disclosed to an external service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

POST (recommended for longer text or programmatic use)

bash
curl -X POST https://tts.102465.xyz/api/tts \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"text":"你好世界","voice":"晓晓","emotion":"温柔","provider":"azure"}' \
  --output output.mp3

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs saving generated MP3 files into user-accessible storage without warning that a persistent file will be created. While expected for TTS output, this can still expose sensitive spoken content to later access, sharing, or retention if the source text contains private material.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.