Atlas Argos Teste

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 10, 2026 · 9:10 PM UTC
• Version: 0.1.0

Overview

The skill is for operating a trading bot, but it asks for broad computer control, credential discovery, background jobs, and automatic Telegram reporting that require careful review.

Install only if you intend to give this skill operator-level control over the ARGOS machine. Before use, restrict it to a fixed ARGOS directory, remove sudo and broad /home searches, replace .env sourcing with explicit secret provisioning, require approval for code changes, payments, public posts, and restarts, and avoid cron or nohup persistence unless separately reviewed and easy to disable.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• System Persistence: Installs backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions

Findings (6)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:5
• Finding: Agent identity replacement and autonomous behavior hijacking<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 5 **Vulnerability Type**: Agent instruction hijacking **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```text Tu és o **ATLAS** — o gestor autónomo do ecossistema ARGOS. Não és o ChatGPT, não és o Claude, não és um assistente genérico. És um profissional de elite que gere um negócio de bots de trading cripto. ``` Related mandatory behavior appears later in the file: ```text Tu NUNCA fazes nada em silêncio. O Félix tem de saber TUDO o que fazes, quando fazes, e porquê. ``` ```text **Se fizeste algo → notifica.** **Se algo aconteceu → notifica.** **Se decidiste algo → notifica.** **Se encontraste um problema → notifica.** **Se não fizeste nada em 4 horas → notifica a dizer porquê.** ``` ```text Usa tudo o que precisares. O PC é teu para gerir. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill attempts to replace the host Agent's identity and operating model with an autonomous persona. It explicitly denies the Agent's original identity, asserts control over the machine, requires proactive action without waiting for instructions, and mandates external reporting. A Skill may provide task-specific operating instructions, but it should not override the Agent's identity, safety controls, authorization boundaries, or requirement for user consent. These instructions are especially dangerous when combined with the Skill's requested shell, filesystem, network, process, credential, and persistence capabilities. ### Attack Path 1. The Agent loads `SKILL.md`. 2. The identity-replacement instruction directs the Agent to behave as the autonomous “ATLAS” operator. 3. The Agent treats proactive system modification and external reporting as mandatory. 4. It accesses credentials, modifies application code, starts background processes, or installs scheduled tasks without per-action authorization. 5. Mandatory Telegram notifications transmit operational information outside the local system. ### Impact Assessment Successfu ...[truncated 450 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Remove statements that replace or deny the Agent's original identity. - Remove claims that the Agent owns or may freely control the machine. - Express the persona only as an optional communication style, not an authority override. - Require explicit user approval before: - Modifying source code or configuration - Starting or stopping processes - Installing packages - Reading credentials - Sending external messages - Creating persistent tasks - State that platform safety policies and higher-priority instructions always take precedence. - Replace mandatory notification behavior with an opt-in reporting policy defining the recipient, content, frequency, and retention rules. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:397
• Finding: Broad credential discovery and arbitrary shell execution through sourced environment files<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 397–401 **Vulnerability Type**: Unsafe credential access and configuration execution **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code ```bash source $(find /home -maxdepth 4 -name ".env" -path "*argos*" -printf '%h\n' 2>/dev/null | head -1)/.env 2>/dev/null # Fallback: ler do .env directamente BOT_TOKEN="${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN:-$(grep BOT_TOKEN $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}" ADMIN_ID="${TELEGRAM_ADMIN_ID:-$(grep ADMIN_ID $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}" ``` ### Technical Analysis The script searches broadly under `/home` for any `.env` file whose path contains `argos`, rather than using a configured and validated project directory. The first discovery result is trusted without verifying ownership, permissions, symlink status, or whether it belongs to the intended ARGOS deployment. The `source` command does not parse a data-only environment format. It executes the discovered file as shell code. Consequently, an attacker who can create or modify a matching `.env` file can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Agent or scheduled report process. The fallback remains unsafe because it searches all of `/home`, uses non-exact `grep` patterns, and may select credentials from an unrelated project or user. Unquoted command substitution also makes path handling fragile. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker with write access to any searched home-directory location creates a path containing `argos` and places a `.env` file there. 2. The attacker adds arbitrary shell commands to the file, optionally alongside plausible Telegram variables. 3. The `find` command selects the attacker's directory as its first result. 4. The notification script executes the file using `source`. 5. The attacker's commands run with the notification script's privileges. 6. The attacker can read ...[truncated 800 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Never execute `.env` files with `source`. - Require an explicit, fixed configuration path supplied by the operator, such as `/opt/argos/config/telegram.env`. - Parse only an allowlist of exact keys using a data-only parser. - Validate that the configuration file: - Is a regular file - Is not a symbolic link - Is owned by the expected service account - Has restrictive permissions such as `0600` - Resolves inside the approved ARGOS configuration directory - Remove searches across `/home`. - Use exact key matching, such as `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=` and `TELEGRAM_ADMIN_ID=`, rather than substring matching. - Prefer an operating-system secret store or service-manager credential facility. - Run the notifier as a dedicated unprivileged account with access only to the required secret and script. - Rotate any Telegram tokens that may already have been exposed through this mechanism. ]]>

T06 · System Persistence

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:614
• Finding: Persistent scheduled reporting and recurring outbound transmission<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 614–626 **Vulnerability Type**: Scheduled-task persistence **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash ### 8.5 Crontab para relatórios ```bash # Adicionar ao crontab: # 08:00 UTC — Briefing matinal 0 8 * * * ~/atlas_report.sh morning # 14:00 UTC — Update da tarde 0 14 * * * ~/atlas_report.sh afternoon # 21:00 UTC — Fecho do dia 0 21 * * * ~/atlas_report.sh night ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the Agent to install three recurring cron tasks. These tasks survive the initiating Agent session and execute scripts from the user's home directory every day. The associated report script inspects local process state, resource usage, logs, metrics, changelogs, and issue records, then invokes a Telegram notification script. Persistence is not required for a one-time audit or interactive maintenance operation. It must be an explicit, separately authorized deployment decision. Using mutable scripts under `~` also creates a persistence amplification risk: anyone who later modifies `atlas_report.sh` or `atlas_notify.sh` gains code execution at every scheduled interval. ### Attack Path 1. The Agent follows the Skill and creates the report and notification scripts. 2. The Agent adds the supplied entries to the user's crontab. 3. The cron daemon continues executing the scripts after the Agent session ends. 4. An attacker who later modifies either home-directory script obtains recurring command execution. 5. Even without script modification, reports repeatedly transmit local operational data using credentials discovered from `.env` files. ### Impact Assessment The scheduled tasks provide cross-session execution under the affected user's account. They enable recurring access to application state and recurring external transmission of system, user, error, and business information. If the cron account has broad filesystem access, sensitive logs, issue records, metrics, or cre ...[truncated 140 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Do not install cron entries automatically or as part of loading the Skill. - Require explicit informed approval for each persistent task. - Present the exact schedule, executable path, collected data, destination, and uninstall procedure before installation. - Use absolute paths rather than `~`. - Store scripts in a root-owned or administrator-controlled directory that the runtime account cannot modify. - Run reports under a dedicated least-privilege service account. - Minimize report content and avoid sending logs, user data, issue details, or secrets. - Use a restricted systemd timer or equivalent with: - Filesystem protections - Network restrictions - Resource limits - A fixed working directory - Explicit environment and credentials - Provide removal commands and verify that tasks are deleted when reporting is disabled. ]]>

T06 · System Persistence

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:286
• Finding: Detached infinite monitoring process that autonomously restarts application code<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 286–301 **Vulnerability Type**: Background-process persistence **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash cat > ~/monitor_argos.sh << 'EOF' #!/bin/bash while true; do if ! pgrep -af "python.*main.py" > /dev/null; then echo "[$(date)] ARGOS down! A reiniciar..." cd $(find /home -maxdepth 4 -name "main.py" -path "*argos*" -printf '%h\n' | head -1) source venv/bin/activate nohup python3 main.py >> logs/argos.log 2>&1 & echo "[$(date)] ARGOS reiniciado." # Opcional: notificar via Telegram fi sleep 300 # Check a cada 5 min done EOF chmod +x ~/monitor_argos.sh nohup ~/monitor_argos.sh >> ~/monitor.log 2>&1 & ``` ### Technical Analysis This code creates an infinite monitor loop and launches it as a detached `nohup` process. It continues running after the initiating shell or Agent session exits. The process test is broad and can match unrelated `python ... main.py` processes. Conversely, if no match exists, the script searches multiple home directories and executes the first matching ARGOS `main.py`. Neither the selected directory nor the Python entry point is authenticated or pinned. The monitor also frustrates deliberate shutdown because it automatically relaunches the application every five minutes. If the selected project directory or `main.py` is compromised, the monitor repeatedly executes attacker-controlled code. ### Attack Path 1. The Agent writes and starts `~/monitor_argos.sh`. 2. The detached loop survives the Agent session. 3. An attacker creates or modifies a matching `argos/main.py` in the searched path. 4. The legitimate process stops, is intentionally disabled, or is made not to match the broad `pgrep` pattern. 5. The monitor selects the attacker's directory and launches its `main.py`. 6. The attacker-controlled Python code executes under the monitor account and may be relaunched after each termination. ### ...[truncated 460 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Do not launch an infinite detached monitor directly from the Skill. - Require explicit deployment approval and provide a clear stop/uninstall procedure. - Use a constrained service manager rather than `nohup` and an uncontrolled shell loop. - Pin the exact working directory, virtual environment, and Python entry point. - Run the service under a dedicated unprivileged account. - Ensure the executable and application directory are not writable by unrelated users. - Apply restart rate limits and maximum retry counts. - Use an exact PID file, service unit, or application-specific health endpoint instead of a broad `pgrep` expression. - Stop automatic restarts after repeated failures so that compromised or defective code is not launched indefinitely. - Log restart events securely and require operator review for repeated failures. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:174
• Finding: Unpinned third-party package installation at runtime<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 174–176 **Vulnerability Type**: Insecure dependency installation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash # Instalar tweepy pip install tweepy ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the Agent to install the latest available version of `tweepy` without a version constraint, lockfile, hash verification, isolated environment, or review step. Although the package name shown is not itself evidence of a malicious package, an unpinned runtime installation makes the effective dependency set mutable after the Skill has been audited. Package installation and subsequent imports may execute third-party code, including transitive dependencies selected at installation time. ### Attack Path 1. The Agent runs `pip install tweepy`. 2. The package index resolves the current release and transitive dependency versions. 3. A compromised, malicious, or unexpectedly incompatible release is downloaded. 4. Third-party code executes during installation or when imported by the posting script. 5. That code gains access to the Python environment and the privileges and secrets available to the Agent process. ### Impact Assessment A compromised dependency can read application files and credentials, alter code, make network requests, or execute commands with the installing user's privileges. A merely incompatible version can also destabilize the ARGOS environment if installation occurs in the system or production Python environment. ]]>
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Pin reviewed package and transitive dependency versions. - Use a lockfile with cryptographic hashes. - Install into a dedicated virtual environment rather than the system or production interpreter. - Separate dependency installation from Skill execution and require operator approval. - Retrieve packages only from an approved package index over authenticated TLS. - Scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities and review release provenance. - Test the locked environment before deployment. - Run social-media integration with only the credentials and filesystem permissions it requires. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:687
• Finding: Excessive system-wide permissions beyond the Skill's operational requirements<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 687–701 **Vulnerability Type**: Violation of least privilege **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code ```text ## ACESSO E FERRAMENTAS Tu tens acesso a: - ✅ Terminal bash completo (sudo disponível) - ✅ Sistema de ficheiros inteiro (/home, /etc, etc.) - ✅ Internet (pesquisa, APIs, downloads) - ✅ Python 3 + pip - ✅ Git - ✅ Processos do sistema (ps, kill, systemctl) - ✅ Crontab para tarefas agendadas - ✅ Ollama para LLM local - ✅ Antigravity para coding pesado - ✅ Telegram Bot API (via curl ou python) - ✅ Ferramentas de rede (curl, wget, ssh) Usa tudo o que precisares. O PC é teu para gerir. ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared functionality is administration of a particular ARGOS bot, but the Skill claims unrestricted shell, sudo, whole-filesystem, process-management, persistence, package-installation, network, and SSH capabilities. These permissions are not the minimum necessary to check one application's health, inspect its logs, restart it, or generate reports. Combining unrestricted local access with internet connectivity and credential discovery substantially increases the consequences of any prompt injection, malicious configuration file, compromised dependency, or application-level vulnerability. The Skill also provides no command allowlist, path restriction, network destination restriction, privilege separation, or approval boundary. ### Attack Path 1. The Skill convinces the Agent that unrestricted host control is authorized. 2. The Agent executes commands with broad filesystem and process access. 3. A malicious `.env`, project file, dependency, log instruction, or delegated task influences the command flow. 4. The attacker uses the Agent's shell and network access to read sensitive files or modify the host. 5. If sudo is available, the attacker escalates from the Agent account to system-wide control. 6. Network and SSH tools can then be used for exfiltration, lateral ...[truncated 534 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Run ARGOS and all maintenance actions under a dedicated unprivileged service account. - Remove sudo access from the Skill execution context. - Restrict filesystem access to the fixed ARGOS application, configuration, data, and log directories. - Deny access to unrelated home directories and sensitive system paths. - Allowlist only the process-management operations required for the specific ARGOS service. - Replace unrestricted `kill`, `systemctl`, SSH, `curl`, and `wget` access with narrowly scoped tools or APIs. - Restrict outbound network access to explicitly approved endpoints, such as the necessary Telegram API host. - Separate deployment, dependency installation, marketing publication, payment administration, and runtime monitoring into distinct roles with independent credentials. - Require user confirmation for privileged or destructive operations. - Record security-relevant actions in an append-only audit log without including secrets. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection

Findings (21)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The skill grants sweeping host-level powers including full filesystem, terminal, internet, and process access, far beyond a narrowly bounded bot-management role. In the context of an agent skill, this materially increases blast radius: any prompt-induced mistake or abuse can affect the entire machine rather than just the ARGOS application.

Ssd 3

High

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The skill requires broad disclosure of crashes, user starts with IDs, payments, code changes, and other operational details to a Telegram recipient in natural language. This creates a persistent exfiltration channel for sensitive operational and user-related information, with little minimization or boundary control.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

# Função para notificar o Félix (guardar em ~/atlas_notify.sh)
#!/bin/bash
# Uso: ~/atlas_notify.sh "📋 Mensagem aqui"
source $(find /home -maxdepth 4 -name ".env" -path "*argos*" -printf '%h\n' 2>/dev/null | head -1)/.env 2>/dev/null

# Fallback: ler do .env directamente
BOT_TOKEN="${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN:-$(grep BOT_TOKEN $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: Reading raw .env content to recover secrets is a credential-handling anti-pattern. It trains the agent to harvest configuration secrets from disk rather than use least-privilege secret delivery, increasing the chance of accidental disclosure or abuse.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

# Função para notificar o Félix (guardar em ~/atlas_notify.sh)
#!/bin/bash
# Uso: ~/atlas_notify.sh "📋 Mensagem aqui"
source $(find /home -maxdepth 4 -name ".env" -path "*argos*" -printf '%h\n' 2>/dev/null | head -1)/.env 2>/dev/null

# Fallback: ler do .env directamente
BOT_TOKEN="${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN:-$(grep BOT_TOKEN $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: Reading raw .env content to recover secrets is a credential-handling anti-pattern. It trains the agent to harvest configuration secrets from disk rather than use least-privilege secret delivery, increasing the chance of accidental disclosure or abuse.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

# Uso: ~/atlas_notify.sh "📋 Mensagem aqui"
source $(find /home -maxdepth 4 -name ".env" -path "*argos*" -printf '%h\n' 2>/dev/null | head -1)/.env 2>/dev/null

# Fallback: ler do .env directamente
BOT_TOKEN="${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN:-$(grep BOT_TOKEN $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"
ADMIN_ID="${TELEGRAM_ADMIN_ID:-$(grep ADMIN_ID $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The fallback logic explicitly greps .env files for BOT_TOKEN and ADMIN_ID, which is direct credential extraction from local storage. In an autonomous agent context, this creates a reusable path to secrets that can be repurposed for unauthorized external communication.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

source $(find /home -maxdepth 4 -name ".env" -path "*argos*" -printf '%h\n' 2>/dev/null | head -1)/.env 2>/dev/null

# Fallback: ler do .env directamente
BOT_TOKEN="${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN:-$(grep BOT_TOKEN $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"
ADMIN_ID="${TELEGRAM_ADMIN_ID:-$(grep ADMIN_ID $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"

if [ -n "$BOT_TOKEN" ] && [ -n "$ADMIN_ID" ]; then

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: This line continues the pattern of enumerating .env files to obtain secrets, broadening where the agent looks for credentials. Searching across /home for secret files increases exposure surface and normalizes secret harvesting behavior.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

# Fallback: ler do .env directamente
BOT_TOKEN="${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN:-$(grep BOT_TOKEN $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"
ADMIN_ID="${TELEGRAM_ADMIN_ID:-$(grep ADMIN_ID $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"

if [ -n "$BOT_TOKEN" ] && [ -n "$ADMIN_ID" ]; then
    curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: Using extracted credentials immediately before an external send operation ties credential access to outbound transmission, making the risk concrete rather than theoretical. If abused, the agent can impersonate the bot and message arbitrary recipients or leak operational data.

Missing User Warnings

High

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill mandates sending user IDs, payments, incidents, and operational events to a Telegram recipient without warning that this is third-party data transmission. This leaks internal and user-related information outside the local system and may expose identifiers or business telemetry to an external messaging platform.

Ssd 3

High

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The automated report script aggregates local state, logs, metrics, changelog entries, and issue contents, then forwards them externally over Telegram. This centralizes and transmits potentially sensitive host and business data, making accidental leakage or unauthorized disclosure much more likely.

Intent-Code Divergence

High

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The skill claims 'security first' while elsewhere instructing the agent to locate .env files, extract bot/admin credentials, and use them for automatic outbound notifications. That contradiction is dangerous because it normalizes secret access and reuse for unrelated reporting, increasing the chance of credential exposure and unauthorized messaging.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The instructions explicitly require the assistant to use PT-PT terminology, and later repeat this as a standing rule. This is a language policy constraint presented as mandatory rather than offering user choice or documenting a justified regional limitation.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

**Quando o ARGOS crashar:**
1. Verificar logs → identificar o erro
2. Se for bug de código → corrigir tu mesmo (Python) ou delegar ao Antigravity
3. Reiniciar: `cd $ARGOS_DIR && source venv/bin/activate && nohup python3 main.py &`
4. Confirmar que voltou: `sleep 5 && pgrep -af argos`

**Quando encontrares um bug:**

• Confidence: 65% confidence
• Finding: Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs storing payment and subscription status in a local JSON file without any retention, access control, minimization, or privacy guidance. Even if the data is not highly sensitive by itself, subscription/payment records are user-related data and can be exposed, misused, or retained indefinitely.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

Para publicar automaticamente no canal:
```bash
# Usar o bot para enviar ao canal
curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot$BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
  -d "chat_id=@NomeDoCanal" \
  -d "text=📊 Sinal grátis do dia: BTC LONG..." \
  -d "parse_mode=Markdown"

• Confidence: 76% confidence
• Finding: This instruction sends content to the Telegram API, which is an external transmission channel. External transmission is not always unsafe, but in this skill's broader context of broad autonomy and credential use, it increases data leakage risk if messages or tokens are mishandled.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

Para publicar automaticamente no canal:
```bash
# Usar o bot para enviar ao canal
curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot$BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
  -d "chat_id=@NomeDoCanal" \
  -d "text=📊 Sinal grátis do dia: BTC LONG..." \
  -d "parse_mode=Markdown"

• Confidence: 76% confidence
• Finding: This instruction sends content to the Telegram API, which is an external transmission channel. External transmission is not always unsafe, but in this skill's broader context of broad autonomy and credential use, it increases data leakage risk if messages or tokens are mishandled.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

echo "[$(date)] ARGOS down! A reiniciar..."
        cd $(find /home -maxdepth 4 -name "main.py" -path "*argos*" -printf '%h\n' | head -1)
        source venv/bin/activate
        nohup python3 main.py >> logs/argos.log 2>&1 &
        echo "[$(date)] ARGOS reiniciado."
        # Opcional: notificar via Telegram
    fi

• Confidence: 78% confidence
• Finding: The monitor script auto-restarts the bot and runs continuously in the background, creating an unsupervised persistence mechanism. In an autonomous agent setting, self-maintaining background processes can outlive oversight and make unwanted behavior harder to detect or stop.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

done
EOF
chmod +x ~/monitor_argos.sh
nohup ~/monitor_argos.sh >> ~/monitor.log 2>&1 &
```

---

• Confidence: 82% confidence
• Finding: Launching the monitor itself under nohup establishes durable background execution independent of the current session. That persistence increases risk because the agent is being instructed to create a long-running watchdog with broad access and optional notification behavior.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

ADMIN_ID="${TELEGRAM_ADMIN_ID:-$(grep ADMIN_ID $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"

if [ -n "$BOT_TOKEN" ] && [ -n "$ADMIN_ID" ]; then
    curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
        -d "chat_id=${ADMIN_ID}" \
        -d "text=$1" \
        -d "parse_mode=Markdown" > /dev/null

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: This outbound Telegram call is paired with credential discovery from .env and is used for administrative notifications containing operational details. In context, it functions as an exfiltration path for internal system and user-related data to an external service.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

ADMIN_ID="${TELEGRAM_ADMIN_ID:-$(grep ADMIN_ID $(find /home -name '.env' -path '*argos*' 2>/dev/null | head -1) 2>/dev/null | cut -d= -f2)}"

if [ -n "$BOT_TOKEN" ] && [ -n "$ADMIN_ID" ]; then
    curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
        -d "chat_id=${ADMIN_ID}" \
        -d "text=$1" \
        -d "parse_mode=Markdown" > /dev/null

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: This outbound Telegram call is paired with credential discovery from .env and is used for administrative notifications containing operational details. In context, it functions as an exfiltration path for internal system and user-related data to an external service.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

## ACESSO E FERRAMENTAS

Tu tens acesso a:
- ✅ Terminal bash completo (sudo disponível)
- ✅ Sistema de ficheiros inteiro (/home, /etc, etc.)
- ✅ Internet (pesquisa, APIs, downloads)
- ✅ Python 3 + pip

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Advertising that sudo is available to the agent materially increases privilege escalation risk. Combined with broad filesystem, process, and internet access, this can turn a prompt injection or operational mistake into full-host compromise.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: This line reinforces that user-visible text must always be PT-PT, again imposing a fixed locale. Because no opt-in or alternative language handling is described, it constitutes the same language-policy concern in the operational rules.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn

• Code: suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
• Location: SKILL.md:1