T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Executed Directly by Bash
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This web-search skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but its install instructions and data-sharing defaults need human review before use.
Review before installing. Prefer the connected MCP tool or a verified, pinned CLI installation over the curl-to-bash or unpinned global npm commands. Do not submit secrets, signed URLs, private/internal links, regulated data, or confidential research terms unless you are comfortable sending them to Search1API and any selected search provider. Use browser login rather than pasting API keys where possible, and keep keys out of chat, logs, and shell history.
SKILL.md:24Unverified Remote Installer Executed Directly by Bash
SKILL.md:27Unpinned Global npm Package Installation
SKILL.md:66Automatic External Submission of Potentially Sensitive URLs and Queries
The skill recommends installing software by piping a remote script directly into bash. This pattern bypasses review of the downloaded content and creates a direct remote-code-execution path if the server, distribution channel, or network path is compromised.
server or install the CLI:
curl -fsSL https://cli.search1api.com/install.sh | bash
Or via npm:
The explicit use of | bash creates a command-chaining pattern that immediately executes untrusted remote content. In an agent or assisted environment, this is especially dangerous because it normalizes one-step execution of code the user and system have not inspected.
server or install the CLI:
curl -fsSL https://cli.search1api.com/install.sh | bash
Or via npm:
The skill routes user queries, URLs, and page retrieval requests to Search1API, but it does not instruct the agent to warn the user that this data will be transmitted to an external third-party service. In contexts involving sensitive links, internal URLs, or private research topics, this can create an avoidable privacy and data-handling risk.
The skill is configured to trigger on very broad phrases like general web lookup, news, URL sharing, and common research requests. This can cause the agent to invoke the skill in many ordinary conversations, increasing the chance that user data or URLs are unnecessarily sent to an external service without clear user intent or informed consent.
The documentation instructs the agent to use Baidu for Chinese queries by default rather than presenting it as an optional engine choice. That creates a routing decision based on language without user consent, which can have privacy, compliance, and trust implications depending on the user's jurisdiction and the sensitivity of the searched content.
The skill includes instructions to set API keys manually and via environment variable, but it does not warn about safe credential handling. This increases the risk that users expose secrets in shell history, shared terminals, logs, screenshots, or by pasting keys directly into chats or commands.
The examples encourage sending user queries and URLs to third-party search and crawling services without any disclosure, consent, or privacy warning. In a web-search skill this is expected behavior, but failing to note the external data transfer can still expose sensitive prompts, internal URLs, or private research topics to outside providers.
No suspicious patterns detected.