T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:19- Finding
Unvalidated Upload Destination and Unrestricted Local File Selection
- Content
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` ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow accepts both an absolute local file path and a caller-supplied `globalDomain`. It does not require the destination to use HTTPS, belong to an approved domain allowlist, or remain approved after redirects. It also does not restrict the selected file to an authorized workspace, resolve and validate symbolic links, reject sensitive file types, or require confirmation before reading and uploading the file. Consequently, an attacker who can influence the skill inputs may direct the agent to read any file available under the agent process's existing permissions and transmit its contents to an attacker-controlled upload service. The `ous-token-v2` credential would also be sent to that destination, potentially exposing both local data and an active service token. This issue does not independently grant operating-system privileges beyond those already held by the agent. Its severity arises from crossing two insufficiently validated trust boundaries: the local filesystem boundary and the outbound network boundary. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker influences the skill invocation, such as through prompt injecti ...[truncated 1442 chars]- Remediation
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