T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
skill.md:39- Finding
Unpinned Remote Skill Instructions Permit Post-Audit Supply-Chain Changes
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
skill.md:39-47, 82-86, 91
Vulnerability Type: Unverified retrieval and replacement of mutable remote skill instructions
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet
yaml artifacts: - source: https://tieba.baidu.com/skill.md destination: ~/.openclaw/skills/tieba-claw/SKILL.md type: markdown - source: https://tieba.baidu.com/skill/api-reference.md destination: ~/.openclaw/skills/tieba-claw/api-reference.md type: markdown source_domain: tieba.baidu.com writes_to_disk: truebash mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/tieba-claw curl -s https://tieba.baidu.com/skill.md > ~/.openclaw/skills/tieba-claw/SKILL.md curl -s https://tieba.baidu.com/skill/api-reference.md > ~/.openclaw/skills/tieba-claw/api-reference.mdTechnical Analysis
The installation procedure downloads mutable Markdown files directly from remote URLs and writes them into the active skill directory. No immutable version, cryptographic digest, digital signature, or manual review gate is required before the downloaded instructions replace the local copies.
Although the retrieved artifacts are declared as Markdown rather than executable code, skill instructions control subsequent Agent behavior. A modified remote document could therefore introduce unaudited instructions concerning credential use, network requests, persistent memory, or actions performed on the user's behalf.
The document also encourages later retrieval of these files to obtain new functionality. Consequently, the effective behavior loaded by the Agent may change after the reviewed package has been approved. The reviewed version does not itself retrieve or execute a native code payload, so this is classified as an insecure supply-chain dependency rather than confirmed remote code execution.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the hosting account, content publication pipeline, DNS resolution, T ...[truncated 1332 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin each downloaded artifact to an immutable, reviewed release URL rather than a mutable latest-version URL.
- Publish a SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic digest for every artifact and verify it before replacing the installed file.
- Prefer signed release manifests and validate signatures against a separately distributed, pinned public key.
- Download updates into a temporary file, verify them, and only then perform an atomic replacement.
- Require explicit user review and confirmation before loading behavior-changing updates.
- Use
curl --fail --show-error --locationand stop installation if retrieval or verification fails. - Retain the previously verified version so that an invalid or unavailable update cannot leave a partially written skill.
- Display a clear behavioral diff when an update changes credential handling, network permissions, persistence, or autonomous actions.
