T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:55- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution Through npx
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:55
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
markdown 3. 索引过期时提示运行 `npx gitnexus analyze`,同时改用 rg 手工追溯。Technical Analysis
The skill instructs the user to invoke
gitnexusthroughnpxwithout specifying an exact package version or verifying package integrity. If the package is not already installed locally,npxcan retrieve executable package content from the configured npm registry.This creates a supply-chain risk because the code executed at audit time may differ from the code originally reviewed. A compromised package release, compromised registry or maintainer account, dependency compromise, or package-name takeover could cause arbitrary package or lifecycle code to run locally.
The instruction only recommends the command and does not automatically execute it. Exploitation therefore requires a user or agent to follow the recommendation in an environment where package retrieval occurs.
Attack Path
- The repository's GitNexus index is missing or considered outdated.
- The skill recommends running
npx gitnexus analyze. - A user or agent executes the recommended command.
npxresolves the unpinned package through the configured npm registry and may download it.- A compromised or malicious package version executes with the invoking process's permissions.
- The package can access resources available to that user, including the current repository and other user-readable local data.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running
npx. The accessible scope may include repository source code, environment variables, credentials available to the process, and user-writable files. No privilege-escalation mechanism, persistence mechanism, credential theft implementation, or confirmed m ...[truncated 67 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
gitnexusto an exact, reviewed version rather than relying on mutable registry resolution. - Verify package provenance and integrity using an approved lockfile, integrity hash, or trusted internal registry.
- Prefer a preinstalled and centrally managed GitNexus binary.
- Require explicit user confirmation before downloading or executing third-party code.
- Document the expected package publisher and official source to reduce dependency-confusion and typosquatting risks.
- Retain the documented
rgfallback so analysis can proceed without executing registry-fetched code.
- Pin
