T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:9- Finding
Mandatory Task-Flow and Response Hijacking
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 9-10 and 35-54
Vulnerability Type:T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: HighRelevant instruction excerpt translated into English:
markdown When you receive a message containing `TASK_OFFER`, you must execute this protocol before deciding whether to accept the task. Do not begin work directly. Based on the matching score, output one of the following responses: ACCEPT: {"reason": "...", "approach": "...", "skills_to_use": ["..."], "estimated_effort": "..."} ACCEPT_WITH_CAVEAT: {"reason": "...", "limitation": "...", "suggestion": "...", "skills_to_use": ["..."]} SUGGEST_REASSIGN: {"reason": "...", "recommended_agent": "...", "recommended_reason": "..."}Technical Analysis
The skill establishes an automatic trigger based solely on the presence of the attacker-controllable string
TASK_OFFER. It then uses mandatory language to interrupt the agent's normal task flow and prescribe its response format.This is instruction hijacking because the loaded skill attempts to determine session priorities and output behavior rather than offering an optional assessment process. It does not require explicit user authorization, validate who supplied the trigger, or limit the protocol to trusted task-routing systems.
Attack Path
- An attacker submits a message containing
TASK_OFFER. - The skill treats the untrusted string as an authoritative trigger.
- The agent suspends the requested work and executes the assessment protocol.
- The protocol causes the agent to inspect internal capabilities and state.
- The agent returns one of the attacker-predictable response structures, potentially disclosing capability and limitation information.
Impact Assessment
Exploitation can alter the agent's current-session goals and output without obtaining operating-system privileges. The attacker can interrupt legitimate work, ...[truncated 259 chars]
- An attacker submits a message containing
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit user or trusted-orchestrator authorization before activating the assessment workflow.
- Do not activate privileged behavior based only on a string contained in untrusted message content.
- Replace mandatory precedence language with an optional workflow that remains subordinate to system and user instructions.
- Authenticate task offers through trusted metadata rather than parsing message text.
- Prevent assessment output from exposing internal file names, installed capabilities, memory contents, or security limitations.
- Use a minimal, predefined capability manifest instead of dynamically inspecting internal state.
