Fix Your Entire Life in 1 Day
v1.0.0Fix your entire life in 1 day. 10 psychological sessions based on Dan Koe's viral article.
⭐ 4· 2.6k·12 current·13 all-time
by@evgyur
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
Name, description, and declared requirements (bash + jq) align with a local, interactive coaching skill that stores session text in $WORKSPACE. There are no requested environment variables or external credentials that would be disproportionate for the stated purpose.
Instruction Scope
Runtime instructions explicitly tell the agent to execute scripts/handler.sh and export.sh and to write user session files under $WORKSPACE/memory/life-architect/. Those scripts are called with raw user responses (e.g., handler.sh save "USER_RESPONSE"), and the skill can create reminders (handler.sh reminders ... and an explicit question about cron reminders). Because the script contents were not provided for review here, this raises concern: shell scripts that accept arbitrary user text can be vulnerable to command injection or could invoke network tools, edit crontab, or upload data. The SKILL.md itself does not document any external endpoints, but the scripts could add them — review of the actual scripts is required.
Install Mechanism
There is no install spec (no downloads) — the skill ships code in the skill bundle. That reduces supply-chain concerns from remote fetches, but executing included scripts still runs code delivered with the skill. This is lower-risk than a remote download, but it's not as low-risk as instruction-only skills with no code files.
Credentials
The skill requests no environment variables or external credentials and stores data under $WORKSPACE, which is proportionate to a journaling/coaching tool. The only privileged surface is the filesystem and whatever the agent process is allowed to do (scheduling, network, etc.), so those runtime capabilities should be reviewed.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false and user-invocable:true (normal). The skill writes persistent user data into $WORKSPACE/memory/life-architect/ (state.json, session files, final-document.md), which is expected. However the SKILL.md and handler interface reference creating reminders; if the scripts create OS-level scheduled tasks (cron/systemd/at) or modify system configuration, that increases persistence and privilege — confirm whether the scripts only write to the skill workspace or also modify system schedulers.
What to consider before installing
What to do before installing or running this skill:
- Inspect the bundled scripts (scripts/handler.sh, scripts/export.sh, scripts/init.sh, scripts/status.sh) before executing anything. Search for network commands (curl, wget, nc, netcat, ssh, scp), remote hosts, base64/openssl decode+exec patterns, and any use of eval, backticks, or unescaped variable expansion that could allow command injection when handling user text.
- Pay special attention to how user input is handled. The handler is called like: handler.sh save "USER_RESPONSE" — if the script inserts that text into shell commands without sanitization, a maliciously crafted response could execute arbitrary commands.
- Check whether the scripts modify system schedulers (crontab, at, systemctl timers) or edit files outside the skill workspace. If they do, ask the author to justify why and consider running in a restricted environment.
- Run the skill in a sandbox first (a throwaway VM or container) and monitor outbound network connections and file writes. Verify reminders behavior (do they only schedule local notifications or attempt to contact external services?).
- Ensure the agent process has minimal permissions; avoid running as root. Back up any important data from your normal workspace before first run.
- If you are not comfortable auditing shell scripts, decline installation or ask the maintainer for a review that documents: (a) that no external network calls are made, (b) that scheduling is done only via local, user-owned crontab entries (if at all), and (c) that user input is safely escaped/handled.
If the scripts are clean and only write session files under $WORKSPACE and schedule reminders via safe, local mechanisms, the skill appears coherent for its coaching purpose. If the scripts contact remote endpoints, modify system-wide config, or use unsafe shell practices, consider the skill untrusted.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Runtime requirements
🧠 Clawdis
