Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed product-search integration that sends shopping queries to Channel3 and returns retailer results, with no evidence of hidden persistence, destructive behavior, or credential theft.
Install only if you are comfortable sending product search terms, filters, and any image URLs to Channel3 using your CHANNEL3_API_KEY. Treat returned buy links as affiliate-tracked redirects, and avoid using the skill for sensitive purchases or private images.
The skill invokes a shell script but does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That increases the chance the host agent grants broader shell access than necessary, making unintended command execution or misuse of the shell capability more likely if the skill is invoked in an unsafe context.
The trigger language is very broad and can match many generic shopping or recommendation requests, causing the skill to activate more often than intended. Because this skill sends user queries and image URLs to a third-party API and uses shell execution, over-invocation can expose more user data externally and expand the attack surface unnecessarily.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
echo ""
echo "Install it:"
echo " macOS: brew install jq"
echo " Ubuntu: sudo apt-get install jq"
exit 1
fi
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# ── Call the API ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" \
-X POST "https://api.trychannel3.com/v1/search" \
-H "x-api-key: ${CHANNEL3_API_KEY:-}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
This shell script sends the assembled request body, including the user's search query, image URL, and filters, to https://api.trychannel3.com via curl. While the network call is central to the script's purpose, there is no visible disclosure in the script output or comments that user-supplied data will be transmitted to a third-party service.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# ── Call the API ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" \
-X POST "https://api.trychannel3.com/v1/search" \
-H "x-api-key: ${CHANNEL3_API_KEY:-}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$BODY")
The manifest says to use the skill when "finding products, comparing prices, or checking availability," which are broad, everyday requests without clear trigger boundaries or exclusions. In a manifest file, this can create ambiguous activation scope and increase the chance of unintended invocation.
No suspicious patterns detected.