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Security audit

OMNI — All-In-One Master Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This all-purpose routing skill is not plainly malicious, but it directs broad persistent memory and future-instruction updates without clear user consent or limits.

Review this carefully before installing. It is a powerful catch-all skill, so use it only if you are comfortable with broad routing across personal communications, local files, system tools, automation, and cloud/deployment workflows. Disable or rewrite the persistent memory and promotion instructions unless you explicitly want cross-session logging, and require confirmation before external messages, public posts, pushes, deployments, production changes, paid API calls, or sensitive-data handling.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
references/brain.md:224
Finding

Mandatory Cross-Session Memory Writes and Promotion into Persistent Agent Instructions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:68-76, SKILL.md:137-143, references/brain.md:224-260, references/brain.md:427-520, references/brain.md:528-531
Vulnerability Type: T02: Agent Memory Poisoning, T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:68-76

markdown
## Brain Protocol (ALWAYS ACTIVE)

**Before any action, load `references/brain.md`.** It governs:
1. **Error Memory** — Check `memory/mistakes.json` before repeating any failed approach
2. **Loop Detection** — Same command fails twice? STOP. Change approach entirely.
3. **Anti-Hallucination** — Verify before stating. Say "I don't know" when uncertain.
4. **Precision Code** — Read → Research → Plan → Write → Test → Deliver
5. **Perfect Memory** — Log decisions, errors, patterns to `memory/*.json`
6. **Debug Protocol** — Reproduce → Isolate → Hypothesize → Test → Document

SKILL.md:137-143

markdown
0. **Brain Check** — Load brain.md. Check mistakes.json. Verify you're not in a loop.
1. **Identify** — Classify the task into domain(s)
2. **Load** — Read only relevant reference(s)
3. **Plan** — Outline approach before executing
4. **Execute** — Use the best tool for the job (CLI > API > manual)
5. **Verify** — Check output quality before delivering
6. **Log** — Record to mistakes.json if error, patterns.json if reusable, daily log always
7. **Report** — Summarize what was done and what's next

references/brain.md:224-260

markdown
## 5. Perfect Memory System

### Memory Architecture

memory/ ├── mistakes.json ← Error log (append-only) ├── patterns.json ← Reusable solutions ├── decisions.json ← Why things were decided ├── heartbeat-state.json ← Periodic check state └── YYYY-MM-DD.md ← Daily activity log

text

### What Gets Logged

#### Every Session
- Key decisions and their rationale
- Files created/modifi
...[truncated 6203 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the requirement to read persistent memory before every action. Memory retrieval should be opt-in and limited to tasks where prior context is necessary.
  2. Remove automatic session-wide logging. Store only the minimum metadata needed for a defined purpose, and require explicit user consent before retaining user preferences or task context.
  3. Prohibit this Skill from modifying SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, TOOLS.md, brain.md, or other global instruction files.
  4. Confine any Skill-specific state to a dedicated directory with least-privilege permissions, such as memory/omni/, rather than shared global memory.
  5. Treat recalled memory as untrusted data, never as executable instructions. Clearly delimit memory content and prevent it from overriding system, developer, safety, or current user instructions.
  6. Add provenance metadata identifying the source, session, author, timestamp, and confidence of each entry.
  7. Require explicit human review and approval before any memory entry can become a reusable rule.
  8. Add schema validation and reject entries containing tool directives, privilege changes, external transmission instructions, or attempts to alter agent policy.
  9. Apply retention limits and provide deletion controls. Avoid storing full command output, full error messages, credentials, personal information, or private communications.
  10. Add integrity controls, such as append auditing or signed records, and ensure untrusted task content cannot directly edit stored memory.
  11. Replace the promotion workflow with a report that proposes a change without applying it. A trusted administrator should review and manually implement accepted changes.
  12. Document the memory permissions and scope so users understand whether state is session-local, user-local, or shared across agents.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (50)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The trigger language is extremely broad (for example, 'do everything', 'all in one', and any task where routing matters), which can cause this catch-all skill to activate for a wide range of normal requests. In a system with many installed skills, this increases the chance that a generic router intercepts tasks that should have gone to a more constrained specialist, expanding access scope and weakening least-privilege routing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/communications.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
### WhatsApp
- **Skill**: `wacli`
- Send messages to contacts
- Search/sync history
- Format: No markdown headers, use **bold**

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/multi-agent.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
### WhatsApp
- **Skill**: `wacli`
- Send messages to contacts
- Search/sync history
- Format: No markdown headers, use **bold**

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ethics-safety.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
- Never execute destructive commands without confirmation
- Prefer `trash` over `rm`
- Never expose private data
- Never bypass security controls

### Transparency
- State uncertainty honestly

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes omni as the default when no single specialized skill clearly applies, but it does not define measurable routing constraints, confidence thresholds, or exclusion rules. That ambiguity can let the skill claim authority over borderline requests and encourage overbroad delegation to a high-capability router.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The 'Perfect Memory' and related brain protocol instruct the skill to log decisions, errors, and patterns to persistent memory files in broad terms, without any data minimization, consent, retention, or sensitivity filtering. Because omni handles many domains including finance, messaging, documents, and security, this creates a realistic risk of retaining sensitive user-derived data in local artifacts that may later be exposed or reused improperly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The execution principle says to always record errors, reusable patterns, and a daily log, which semantically normalizes broad persistence of user/task information across all operations. In an omni skill that may touch credentials, communications, health, finance, and documents, mandatory logging materially increases privacy and data leakage risk if logs are overinclusive or later accessed by other components.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The document advises reading workspace code and running it to diagnose vague prompts, but does not require notifying the user or obtaining consent before accessing files or executing code. In an omni skill with broad automation and system capabilities, this can cause unauthorized data exposure or unintended side effects from executing untrusted project code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The deployment repair example implies proceeding with deployment to a local development server based on inferred defaults, without a warning that deployment changes system state. In a powerful all-in-one skill, silent or assumption-based deployment behavior is especially risky because it can trigger irreversible environment changes, service exposure, or operational disruption.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Telling the system to retain user preferences across future sessions creates a natural-language data retention instruction without specifying consent, minimization, or expiration. This is dangerous because implementers may store potentially sensitive preference data indefinitely, increasing privacy, compliance, and cross-session profiling risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-design.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

Testing APIs

bash
# curl testing
curl -X POST https://api.example.com/users \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Test", "email": "test@example.com"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-design.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

Testing APIs

bash
# curl testing
curl -X POST https://api.example.com/users \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Test", "email": "test@example.com"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-design.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

Testing APIs

bash
# curl testing
curl -X POST https://api.example.com/users \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Test", "email": "test@example.com"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/brain.md (reported line 128)May include surrounding context.

Testing APIs

bash
# curl testing
curl -X POST https://api.example.com/users \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Test", "email": "test@example.com"}'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends webhook listeners and API endpoints as automation patterns without warning that these integrations can transmit prompts, files, secrets, or other sensitive data off the local system. In an omnibus skill that can operate across many domains, users may invoke these patterns on internal or private workflows without realizing data leaves the trust boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The example 'GitHub PR review → auto-fix → push' normalizes automated repository modification without any warning, approval gate, or dry-run requirement. In a broad master skill with automation and coding capabilities, this can lead to unauthorized or unsafe code changes being committed and pushed to production repositories at scale.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The instruction to 'remember everything' and log broad categories of context establishes expansive cross-session retention without boundaries. In practice, such blanket persistence can accumulate sensitive user data and make secondary use or overexposure more likely, especially in a master skill intended to handle many domains.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The meta-layer explicitly authorizes capability expansion into live web research and requesting user credentials/permissions, which goes beyond a purely cognitive or planning reference. In an omni skill that already spans many domains, this broadens the operational scope of the 'brain' layer and can normalize unsafe data-access or privilege-escalation behaviors without tighter routing or consent controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The anti-hallucination section tells the agent to perform live package queries and external API calls to verify claims. While verification is a valid goal, embedding networked execution in a general 'brain' document effectively grants external access as a default behavior, increasing the chance of unintended data transmission or unauthorized outbound requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The file directs persistent logging of decisions, files modified, problems encountered, and observed user preferences without any notice, consent, retention limit, or minimization guidance. This creates a privacy risk because personal or sensitive user context may be stored across sessions invisibly and reused beyond the user's expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The session logging policy specifically includes observed user preferences and context in persistent memory, which is a form of cross-session profiling. Without consent, scope limitation, or access controls, this can expose personal behavior patterns and increase privacy risk if the memory store is reused or accessed in later tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

Mandating semantic search across all memory before answering prior-work questions encourages broad retrieval from historical data stores, including unrelated or overly sensitive context. This increases the chance of unnecessary exposure of past user information and can bypass contextual minimization by default.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Including low-level system-inspection commands like strace, lsof, and dmesg in a cognitive-layer reference expands it into host-observation and debugging territory. In the context of an all-in-one skill, this can encourage overbroad system interrogation that may expose sensitive process, kernel, file, or network information beyond what is necessary for reasoning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/brain.md (reported line 342)May include surrounding context.

bash
ls -la file
stat file
# Fix: chmod / chown / sudo / check file ownership

"Module/Package not found"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Automatic logging of corrections, feature requests, knowledge gaps, and runtime errors to persistent memory files captures user interactions by default without warning. Because these entries can contain personal details, proprietary inputs, or secrets embedded in errors, the absence of notice and filtering creates a meaningful privacy and data-handling weakness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.