T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:35- Finding
Wallet authentication lacks proof of ownership
- Content
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" ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented authentication request submits only a wallet address. Wallet addresses are public identifiers and are not authentication secrets. The documented flow does not require a signed challenge, nonce, private-key proof, or any other evidence that the requester controls the wallet. If the service behaves as documented, any party that knows another user's wallet address could request a session associated with that address. A secure wallet-authentication protocol must verify possession of the corresponding private key, typically through a nonce-based Sign-In with Ethereum flow. This finding is limited to the behavior documented by the skill. The project does not contain the remote server implementation, so additional unmentioned server-side verification could not be assessed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker obtains a victim's public Ethereum wallet address from the blockchain or another public source. 2. The attacker sends the documented authentication request to `https://tubeify.xyz/index.php`, supplying the victim's address in the `wallet` field. 3. If the endpoint follows the documented flow without additional verification, it returns a session cookie associated with the victim's wallet. 4. The attacker replays that cookie against `process.php` or `status.php`. 5. The attacker may access wallet-associated processing state, processed-video links, or other resources exposed through that session. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could allow application-level impersonation of another wallet holder. Depending on the remote service's authorization model, the attacker ...[truncated 326 chars]- Remediation
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