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Security audit

Tubeify

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent Tubeify API helper, but it needs Review because it sends video, wallet, payment, and session data to a third-party service with weakly documented privacy and session protections.

Install only if you trust tubeify.xyz with the submitted video URL, wallet address, transaction hash, session cookie, and processed-video link. Prefer test or non-confidential media first, avoid shared workspaces for session.txt, delete the cookie file after use, and do not treat wallet-address-only authentication as strong account protection.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Wallet authentication lacks proof of ownership

Content
View full analysis
" ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented authentication request submits only a wallet address. Wallet addresses are public identifiers and are not authentication secrets. The documented flow does not require a signed challenge, nonce, private-key proof, or any other evidence that the requester controls the wallet. If the service behaves as documented, any party that knows another user's wallet address could request a session associated with that address. A secure wallet-authentication protocol must verify possession of the corresponding private key, typically through a nonce-based Sign-In with Ethereum flow. This finding is limited to the behavior documented by the skill. The project does not contain the remote server implementation, so additional unmentioned server-side verification could not be assessed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker obtains a victim's public Ethereum wallet address from the blockchain or another public source. 2. The attacker sends the documented authentication request to `https://tubeify.xyz/index.php`, supplying the victim's address in the `wallet` field. 3. If the endpoint follows the documented flow without additional verification, it returns a session cookie associated with the victim's wallet. 4. The attacker replays that cookie against `process.php` or `status.php`. 5. The attacker may access wallet-associated processing state, processed-video links, or other resources exposed through that session. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could allow application-level impersonation of another wallet holder. Depending on the remote service's authorization model, the attacker ...[truncated 326 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Session cookies are persisted in a predictable workspace file without documented protection

Content
View full analysis
" ``` ### Submit Video for Processing ```bash curl -b session.txt -X POST https://tubeify.xyz/process.php \ -d "video_url=" \ -d "tx_hash=" \ ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented workflow stores HTTP cookies in `session.txt`, a fixed and predictable path in the current working directory. It does not create a private temporary directory, enforce restrictive file permissions, prevent symbolic-link collisions, exclude the file from version control, or remove it after use. The cookie file may contain reusable session credentials. Its confidentiality therefore depends on the workspace permissions, process umask, backup behavior, and repository hygiene of the calling environment. A shared or exposed workspace could allow another local user or process to read and replay the session. Using a fixed path also creates collision risks between concurrent runs. In an attacker-writable directory, a pre-existing symbolic link could redirect cookie output to an unintended file, subject to the behavior and permissions of the invoking process. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the documented authentication command from a shared, backed-up, synchronized, or attacker-accessible working directory. 2. `curl` writes the returned session cookie to the predictable `session.txt` path. 3. An attacker with local or workspace read access copies the cookie file. Alternatively, the file is unintentionally committed, archived, or synchronized. 4. The attacker invokes the documented API endpoints with `curl -b session.txt`. 5. While the session remains valid, the attacker reuses the victim's application session. ### Impact Assessme ...[truncated 495 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
> AI-powered video editing for solo YouTube creators. Upload a raw recording, get back a tight, polished video — no manual editing required.

Tubeify automatically removes dead air, filler words, and awkward pauses from raw video recordings. It accepts a video URL, processes it with GPU-accelerated AI, and returns a cleaned-up version in minutes.

## What This Skill Does

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to upload a video URL and wallet/payment information to an external third-party service, but it does not clearly warn about the privacy and data-handling implications of sending user content off-platform. For a video-editing workflow, submitted URLs may expose sensitive or unpublished media, and users are not given meaningful notice about external processing or retention.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This command sends a wallet address and later a video URL and transaction hash to an external domain, which is a real data exfiltration boundary from the agent/user environment to a third-party service. In this skill's context, that behavior is expected product functionality, but it is still security-relevant because it transmits potentially sensitive identifiers and user media references to an unverified external service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

Authenticate

bash
curl -c session.txt -X POST https://tubeify.xyz/index.php \
  -d "wallet=<YOUR_WALLET_ADDRESS>"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The example workflow repeats the same external transmission pattern, normalizing the disclosure of wallet and video/payment data to tubeify.xyz without an accompanying warning. Repetition in example code increases the likelihood that users or agents will execute these steps without considering privacy, authenticity, or trust of the remote service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. Authenticate
curl -c session.txt -X POST https://tubeify.xyz/index.php \
  -d "wallet=0xYOUR_WALLET"

# 2. Submit video (include your 2 USDC tx hash)

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.