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Security audit

Stagiaire

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill clearly discloses cross-provider AI dispatch, but its claimed protection against file changes leaves shell commands unrestricted.

Review before installing. Use enforced read-only execution for questions and isolated, disposable workspaces for edits. Disabling named editing tools does not constrain shell commands. Share only task content and project information you authorize the selected provider to receive.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Cross-vendor dispatch sends task content to external providers without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to substitute task text into commands that dispatch it to other vendors. Although the external providers are identified, there is no warning that task content may include private user information, proprietary code, or secrets that will leave the current provider's boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The orchestrator is described as unable to modify files, but its configuration still permits shell-based writes.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The configuration disables named file-editing tools but leaves shell execution available and explicitly instructs the orchestrator to use bash for dispatch. Shell commands can still modify or delete files, so the claim that the orchestrator cannot damage the working tree is false. This is particularly dangerous when processing untrusted task content or worker responses, because the supposed read-only boundary does not constrain shell-based actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.