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Security audit

Doc Illustration

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent image-generation skill, but users should be careful because prompts, document details, and chosen reference images can be sent to an OpenAI-compatible provider.

Install only if you are comfortable sending illustration briefs and selected reference images to the configured OpenAI-compatible provider. Use --dry-run first for private design docs, verify OPENAI_BASE_URL before live generation, avoid secrets or confidential architecture details in prompts, and delete JSON sidecars if they contain sensitive project context.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to read environment variables, read local reference files, and invoke a bundled script, but it does not declare those capabilities or bound them with explicit permission requirements. In an agent environment, undeclared access to env/file surfaces can cause unintended secret exposure or broader filesystem interaction than a caller expects.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
The description is broad enough to activate for many normal documentation or code-explanation tasks, increasing the chance the agent invokes an image-generation workflow when not clearly requested. Over-broad triggering can indirectly expose document contents, design notes, or repo context to an external API without sufficiently specific user intent.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The skill enables implicit invocation without any visible trigger constraints, exclusions, or approval gates. In an agent environment, this can cause the image-generation skill to activate on loosely related document tasks and send sensitive technical content, design notes, or repository architecture details to the model/tool without an explicit user request.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
This code sends the user-provided prompt and any reference images to a remote image-generation API, but the tool does not present an explicit warning, consent gate, or data-sensitivity check before transmission. In a documentation/engineering context, briefs and images can easily contain proprietary architecture details, internal notes, or sensitive screenshots, so silent external transmission creates a real confidentiality risk.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## Model selection

- Use `gpt-image-2` for official OpenAI and for `https://aihubmix.com/v1`.
- Use `openai/gpt-image-2` for `https://api.ofox.ai/v1`.
- Default back to `gpt-image-2` unless a provider requires a namespaced model name.

## References
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly supports sending prompts and potentially document-derived content to third-party endpoints such as aihubmix.com and ofox.ai, which is an external transmission path. Because the skill is designed to turn engineering docs, repo explanations, and design specs into prompts, sensitive internal information could be disclosed to non-official providers if endpoint selection is not tightly controlled and disclosed.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.