Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent Shortcuts-generation reference skill, but users should review generated shortcuts carefully before signing or importing them.
Install only if you want Codex to generate Apple Shortcuts files. Before signing or importing any generated shortcut, inspect actions that delete data, run scripts, send network requests, use AI services, read clipboard/device/location data, or change system settings, and ask for confirmation or preview steps when workflows affect personal data.
This section gives implementation details for is.workflow.actions.deletephotos, including the exact parameter structure needed to delete photos, but it does not warn that the operation is destructive and may remove user media. For markdown files, omissions of warnings around behaviors affecting user data should be flagged.
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
<array>
<!-- Menu Start -->
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActionIdentifier</key>
<string>is.workflow.actions.choosefrommenu</string>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<string>EEEEEEEE-EEEE-EEEE-EEEE-EEEEEEEEEEEE</string>
</dict>
</dict>
<!-- Build Prompt -->
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActionIdentifier</key>
<string>is.workflow.actions.gettext</string>
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
<!-- Action 1: Get Text -->
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActionIdentifier</key>
<string>is.workflow.actions.gettext</string>
This markdown file describes actions such as deletefile, documentpicker.save, movefile, downloadurl, and openurl, but does not include any warning that these behaviors can modify user data or transmit data over the network. Under the markdown-specific SQP-2 criteria, a skill description should disclose behaviors that could affect user data, privacy, or system integrity.
The reference lists actions including runworkflow, runshellscript, runosascript, getdevicedetails, and getclipboard, all of which can execute code or access potentially sensitive device/user data. The document presents them as neutral catalog entries without any warning about execution, privacy, or review requirements.
The downloadurl section explains how to send requests, headers, JSON/form bodies, and file uploads, including examples that reference user-provided input. It does not warn that these requests may transmit user content or files to external services, which is a relevant privacy disclosure for markdown skill documentation.
This markdown file documents actions such as deleting alarms, calendars, reminder lists, note folders, voice memos, and shortcuts, as well as toggling system settings, but does not warn readers that these actions can alter or remove user data or change device configuration. Under the markdown-specific SQP-2 criteria, a skill description should disclose behaviors that could affect user data, privacy, or system integrity.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WFWorkflowActions</key>
The AI Query example collects user-provided text and forwards it to Apple Intelligence without any explicit notice that the input may be transmitted to an external or separate AI processing service. In a copy-paste-ready example, this omission can mislead users into sharing sensitive data and normalizes unsafe prompt-handling patterns for downstream shortcut authors.
The Weather + AI example forwards weather conditions, which may be derived from the user's location, to Apple Intelligence without warning about data sharing. Because the example is presented as ready to import, users may unknowingly disclose location-correlated context to an AI service.
The documentation provides a ready-to-use DeletePhotos action example that enables permanent or destructive behavior without any adjacent warning, confirmation step, or safe-usage guidance. In a skill whose purpose is to generate executable Shortcuts plist content, this omission increases the chance that an agent or user will reproduce a deletion workflow that removes photos unintentionally at scale.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
# Shortcut Plist Format
Complete documentation of the `.shortcut` file structure.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
# Shortcut Plist Format
Complete documentation of the `.shortcut` file structure.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
---
name: shortcuts-generator
description: Generate macOS/iOS Shortcuts by creating plist files. Use when asked to create shortcuts, automate workflows, build .shortcut files, or generate Shortcuts plists. Covers 1,155 actions (427 WF*Actions + 728 AppIntents), variable references, and control flow.
allowed-tools: Write, Bash
---
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
---
name: shortcuts-generator
description: Generate macOS/iOS Shortcuts by creating plist files. Use when asked to create shortcuts, automate workflows, build .shortcut files, or generate Shortcuts plists. Covers 1,155 actions (427 WF*Actions + 728 AppIntents), variable references, and control flow.
allowed-tools: Write, Bash
---
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
---
name: shortcuts-generator
description: Generate macOS/iOS Shortcuts by creating plist files. Use when asked to create shortcuts, automate workflows, build .shortcut files, or generate Shortcuts plists. Covers 1,155 actions (427 WF*Actions + 728 AppIntents), variable references, and control flow.
allowed-tools: Write, Bash
---
No suspicious patterns detected.