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Security audit

Git Workflow Assistant

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a Git guidance skill with some risky Git commands documented, but no hidden code, automatic execution, or unrelated behavior.

Install only if you want Git workflow advice, and treat its destructive examples as commands that require confirmation: avoid force-pushing shared or protected branches, and do not run `git reset --hard` unless you have checked `git status` and are sure you want to discard local work.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

bash
git checkout -b feat/my-feature main
# ... code, commits ...
git push -u origin feat/my-feature
# → Open PR on GitHub/GitLab/Azure DevOps

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
## Recovery

- **Undo last commit (keep changes)**: `git reset --soft HEAD~1`
- **Undo last commit (discard changes)**: `git reset --hard HEAD~1`
- **Recover deleted branch**: `git reflog` → find SHA → `git checkout -b <branch> <sha>`
- **Undo a pushed commit**: `git revert <sha>` (safe for shared branches)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The workflow recommends git push --force-with-lease after rebasing, but does not warn that even the safer force-push variant rewrites remote history and can disrupt collaborators if used on shared branches. In a guidance skill, lack of contextual guardrails can lead users to apply the pattern broadly, causing loss of others' commits or repository confusion.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill documents git reset --hard HEAD~1 as a recovery option without any warning that it irreversibly discards uncommitted and committed changes from the working tree/history context. In an assistant setting, users may copy-paste commands directly, so omission of safety guidance materially increases the risk of accidental data loss.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.