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Security audit

Openclaw File Exporter

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill clearly uploads files to a temporary hosting service, but it is too broadly scoped and can upload or overwrite local data without enough safeguards.

Review carefully before installing. Use only for files you are comfortable sending to tmpfile.link, treat returned links as public, avoid configs or credential-bearing directories, and do not pass untrusted custom archive names. A safer version should restrict export paths, block secrets by default, validate filenames, and ask for explicit confirmation before upload.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/export-and-upload.sh:23
Finding

Unrestricted Upload of Arbitrary Local Files to External Hosting

Content
View full analysis
[custom_name]" exit 1 fi if [ ! -e "$SOURCE_PATH" ]; then echo "Error: Source path does not exist: $SOURCE_PATH" exit 1 fi ``` ```bash # Execute upload if [ -n "$USER_ID" ] && [ -n "$AUTH_TOKEN" ]; then echo "Using authenticated upload" RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST \ -H "X-User-Id: $USER_ID" \ -H "X-Auth-Token: $AUTH_TOKEN" \ -F "file=@$ARCHIVE_PATH" \ https://tmpfile.link/api/upload) else echo "Using anonymous upload" RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST \ -F "file=@$ARCHIVE_PATH" \ https://tmpfile.link/api/upload) fi ``` The documented capability is similarly broad: ```markdown - Share OpenClaw files externally - Create backups of any OpenClaw-related files ``` ### Technical Analysis The script only verifies that the supplied source path exists. It does not canonicalize the path, restrict it to approved OpenClaw directories, reject sensitive files, prevent traversal through symbolic links, or request confirmation after displaying the resolved source and upload destination. Any file or directory readable by the account running the Skill can therefore be compressed and transferred to `tmpfile.link`. If authentication variables are absent, the script automatically falls back to an anonymous upload. The resulting download URL is printed to the caller. Although external export is the Skill's documented purpose, allowing arbitrary readable paths exceeds the least privilege needed to export a specifically approved Skill or configuration. In an agent environment, an unsafe reque ...[truncated 1434 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/export-and-upload.sh:33
Finding

Custom Archive Name Allows Path Traversal and Arbitrary File Overwrite

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (8)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The top-level skill description does not prominently warn that exported files are uploaded to a public external hosting service. Users or orchestrators may interpret 'export' or 'download' as a local-only action, leading to accidental disclosure of configuration files, skills, tokens, or other sensitive data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes a shell script capable of exporting arbitrary files, but the manifest declares no explicit tool scope or permissions boundaries. That creates an authorization ambiguity where a broadly callable skill may access and exfiltrate sensitive local files without clear platform-level restriction.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The description is broad enough to match general requests to export, backup, download, or share files, which increases the chance of unintended invocation. In this skill, unintended invocation is especially risky because its core action is packaging and uploading files to an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly supports creating backups and sharing 'any OpenClaw-related files' externally, which can preserve and expose sensitive data beyond the local session. Because uploads go to tmpfile.link and may include configs or skills, this creates durable data exfiltration and persistence risk even if retention is temporary.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

md
- Export/backup an OpenClaw skill
- Download configuration files
- Share OpenClaw files externally
- Create backups of any OpenClaw-related files

## Features

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

https://d.tmpfile.link/public/2026-03-12/uuid/skill-security-auditor.tar.gz

Note: File will be automatically deleted after 7 days

text

## Limitations

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/export-and-upload.sh (reported line 136)May include surrounding context.

sh
https://d.tmpfile.link/public/2026-03-12/uuid/skill-security-auditor.tar.gz
========================================

Note: File will be automatically deleted after 7 days
```

## Limitations

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The core behavior is to compress a user-specified path and upload it to tmpfile.link, but the script provides no explicit pre-upload warning, consent gate, or sensitivity check before transmitting data to an external service. Because the skill advertises exporting configs, skills, or any other files, it can easily send secrets, tokens, or proprietary data off-host, making the context more dangerous rather than less.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The script reads upload-service credentials from environment variables and will automatically use them when present, enabling uploads under an authenticated account without an explicit opt-in at execution time. In a file-export skill that may handle configuration files, skills, or arbitrary paths, this increases the chance that sensitive data is exfiltrated to a third-party service with account attribution and longer-lived access semantics.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.