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Security audit

Gasless stop-loss, limit, TWAP, take-profit & market swaps across 8 EVM chains. Zero fees.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is an instruction-only DeFi swap skill that clearly centers on wallet signing and relay submission, with no hidden code or install-time execution found.

Install only if you intend to let an agent help prepare and submit live DeFi orders. Before signing or approving, verify the chain, token addresses, spender/verifying contract, amounts, recipient, deadline, slippage, triggers, and relay URL, and avoid storing signed payloads anywhere others can read them.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
This example file provides copy-and-modify relay payloads for signed swap orders but does not warn that signatures, deadlines, chain IDs, recipients, and trigger parameters directly control irreversible on-chain asset movement. In a gasless non-custodial trading skill, users may mistakenly reuse stale or production-like values, misroute funds, submit orders on the wrong chain, or relay malformed signed intents without appreciating the financial consequences.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the user to transmit a signed order payload, including the EIP-712 order message and signature, to a remote relay endpoint without an explicit warning that this is a network submission to a third-party service. In a signing workflow, lack of clear disclosure is risky because users may believe the action is local-only, while the submitted signed order can create a live trade order or expose order metadata for relay-side misuse or unintended execution.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
status: "pending",
};

const response = await fetch("https://agents-sink.orbs.network/orders/new", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify(relayPayload),
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
This code performs an outbound POST to an external endpoint with the full relay payload, which includes signed order data. In the context of a wallet/signing skill, transmitting signed artifacts externally is security-sensitive because it can place an order, leak trading intent, and create irreversible side effects if the user did not clearly consent to network submission.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
'{order: $typed[0].message, signature: $sig, status: "pending"}' \
  > ./relay-payload.json

curl -fsS -X POST 'https://agents-sink.orbs.network/orders/new' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data @./relay-payload.json
```
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The documented curl command sends the signed relay payload to a remote service, causing an external transmission of security-sensitive order material. Because the skill is specifically for gasless swap orders, the context makes this more dangerous rather than less: the transmitted signature is intended to authorize market activity, so hidden or under-explained submission can directly trigger trading consequences.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.