T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
src/utils/request.js:86- Finding
API Credential Transmitted in URL Query Strings
- Content
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{ return await postJson( "/api/xiaohongshu/detail/url", { _: Date.now(), token: token }, { url: url, limit: limit }, ); }, ``` The request utility serializes that object directly into the request URL: ```js async function postJson(path, params, data) { if (!path || typeof path !== "string") { throw new Error("path must be a non-empty string"); } if (!params || typeof params !== "object") { throw new Error("params must be an object"); } if (!data || typeof data !== "object") { throw new Error("data must be an object"); } params.skill_name = skillName(); const fullPath = `${path}?${querystring.stringify(params)}`; const jsonData = JSON.stringify(data); const options = { host: constants.BASE_URL, path: fullPath, method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Content-Length": Buffer.byteLength(jsonData), }, }; return await request(options, jsonData); } ``` Polling requests use the same construction: ```js async function getJson(path, params) { if (!path || typeof path !== "string") { throw new Error("path must be a non-empty string"); } if (!params || typeof params !== "object") { throw new Error("params must be an object"); } params._ = Date.now(); const fullPath = `${path}?${querystring.string ...[truncated 2367 chars]- Remediation
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