ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

guaikei-xhs-tool

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed command-line integration for collecting public Xiaohongshu data through a third-party API, with manageable privacy and credential-handling caveats.

Install only if you are comfortable sending Xiaohongshu keywords, URLs, requested limits, and your GUAIKEI_API_TOKEN to the Guaikei API service. Avoid using sensitive search terms on shared systems, and periodically review or delete the generated logs directory because results are saved locally by default.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding
The README states that all task results are automatically saved to the local `logs/` directory, but it does not clearly warn users that scraped public-platform data, searched keywords, URLs, and analysis outputs will persist on disk. Even if the data is public, local retention can create privacy, compliance, or operational exposure on shared machines, CI runners, or improperly secured servers.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The code places both the API token and the target URL into a GET request, which commonly exposes sensitive values in URLs, browser history, intermediary logs, reverse proxies, monitoring systems, and server access logs. While this appears to be standard API usage rather than malicious exfiltration, using GET parameters for credentials materially increases accidental disclosure risk.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The CLI writes the full search output to a local file using a filename derived from user input, but this file does not clearly warn users that query terms and returned public data will be persisted on disk. Even though the data is described as public, local persistence creates a privacy and data-handling risk because sensitive keywords, collected results, and metadata may remain accessible to other local users, backups, or downstream processes longer than expected.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.