T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
src/utils/request.js:76- Finding
API Credential Transmitted in URL Query Strings
- Content
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{ return await postJson( "/api/xiaohongshu/detail/url", { _: Date.now(), token: token }, { url: url, limit: limit }, ); }, constants.CREATE_MAX_ATTEMPTS, (attempt, err) => { utils.printError( `【创建任务重试】 ${attempt + 1}/${constants.CREATE_MAX_ATTEMPTS} 次 - ${err.message}`, ); }, ); } ``` The polling request also places the token in the query parameters: ```js async function getDetailTask(token, url, limit) { return await withRetry( async () => { const res = await getJson("/api/xiaohongshu/detail/info", { _: Date.now(), token: token, url: url, limit: limit, }); if (!res.data || typeof res.data !== "object") { throw new Error(`详情结果格式错误: data 不是对象类型`); } ``` The shared request utility serializes every supplied parameter into the request URL: ```js async function postJson(path, params, data) { if (!path || typeof path !== "string") { throw new Error("path 必须是非空字符串"); } if (!params || typeof params !== "object") { throw new Error("params 必须是对象"); } if (!data || typeof data !== "object") { throw new Error("data 必须是对象"); } params.skill_name = skillName(); const fullPath = `${path}?${querystring.stringify(params)}`; const jsonData = JSON.stringify(data); const options = { host: constants.BASE_URL, ...[truncated 2937 chars]- Remediation
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