T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
src/utils/request.js:76- Finding
API Credential Transmitted in URL Query Strings
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill appears to be a legitimate Xiaohongshu data tool, but it needs review because it understates its breadth in the main description and handles tokens/results in ways that can expose data.
Review before installing. Use a dedicated low-privilege GUAIKEI_API_TOKEN, rotate it if exposed, avoid running this in shared or synced workspaces, and manually delete or protect the generated logs because they can contain research history, comments, profile data, and tokenized Xiaohongshu URLs.
src/utils/request.js:76API Credential Transmitted in URL Query Strings
src/utils/log.js:25Complete Xiaohongshu Results and Tokenized URLs Persisted in Plaintext
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The skill's public positioning is narrowly about comment extraction for a single note, yet its documentation includes full content search with filters for type, sort, time, and limit. Such hidden breadth creates a trust gap: the agent may invoke a large-scale discovery tool where the user expected a narrowly scoped comment fetcher.
The manifest claims a narrow comment-only function, but the body of the skill documents broader note-detail, search, and creator-post retrieval features. Security review and runtime routing often trust manifest declarations; when those declarations understate capability, reviewers may approve access patterns they would otherwise restrict.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "分析这条小红书笔记评论区的主要观点: node src/xiaohongshu/detail-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 100"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "分析这条小红书笔记评论区的主要观点: node src/xiaohongshu/detail-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 100"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "分析这条小红书笔记评论区的主要观点: node src/xiaohongshu/detail-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 100"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "分析这条小红书笔记评论区的主要观点: node src/xiaohongshu/detail-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 100"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "分析这条小红书笔记评论区的主要观点: node src/xiaohongshu/detail-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 100"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "分析这条小红书笔记评论区的主要观点: node src/xiaohongshu/detail-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 100"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "看这个小红书博主最近 20 条作品都在发什么: node src/xiaohongshu/post-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/user/profile/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 20"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "看这个小红书博主最近 20 条作品都在发什么: node src/xiaohongshu/post-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/user/profile/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 20"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "看这个小红书博主最近 20 条作品都在发什么: node src/xiaohongshu/post-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/user/profile/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 20"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "看这个小红书博主最近 20 条作品都在发什么: node src/xiaohongshu/post-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/user/profile/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 20"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "看这个小红书博主最近 20 条作品都在发什么: node src/xiaohongshu/post-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/user/profile/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 20"
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- "只拉这条笔记的评论做观点归纳: node src/xiaohongshu/comment-cli.js --url 'https://www.xiaohongshu.com/explore/xxx?xsec_token=yyy' --limit 100"
Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal