Security audit

Code Documentation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a documentation workflow that reads code and updates comments/docs, with no evidence of hidden execution, exfiltration, persistence, or destructive behavior beyond disclosed documentation cleanup.

Install this if you want a strict documentation standard that may update many source-file headers, function comments, and docs after code changes. Review generated edits before committing, especially deletions of existing comments and repo-wide documentation updates.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Confidence: 80% confidence
Finding: Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
Content: Scanner excerpt · references/api-reference.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

Subsystem File Endpoints
Auth api-auth.md POST /auth/login, POST /auth/logout, POST /auth/refresh
Users api-users.md GET /users/:id, PATCH /users/:id, DELETE /users/:id
Billing api-billing.md GET /billing/plans, POST /billing/subscribe

text

Subsystem	File	Endpoints
Auth	api-auth.md	POST /auth/login, POST /auth/logout, POST /auth/refresh
Users	api-users.md	GET /users/:id, PATCH /users/:id, DELETE /users/:id
Billing	api-billing.md	GET /billing/plans, POST /billing/subscribe

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 96% confidence
Finding: The skill’s trigger conditions are extremely broad, including phrases like 'any time documentation is requested', 'always apply this skill', and post-change workflows such as after significant code changes or completed PRs. This can cause the skill to activate in situations where the user did not explicitly request it, leading to unintended modifications, noisy outputs, or over-application of rigid documentation rules across unrelated tasks.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 50% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · references/api-reference.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.
markdown
# API Reference Base URL: `https://api.example.com/v1` Auth: Bearer token in `Authorization` header. All endpoints require auth unless marked public. | Subsystem | File | Endpoints |

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.