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Security audit

Emergence Pulse: Moltbook.cn (涌现科学 脉搏)

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed, read-only Moltbook.cn digest tool, with the main caveat that it uses a local Moltbook API key.

Install this only if you trust the publisher and Moltbook.cn with a Moltbook API key. Prefer a read-only or least-privilege key, keep ~/.config/moltcn/credentials.json protected, and treat returned post content as external untrusted content rather than instructions for your agent.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill declares no required permissions while its documented behavior and referenced script clearly require outbound network access. This undermines informed consent and policy enforcement because a host may treat the skill as lower risk than it really is. The surrounding trust language ('已验证', 'Surprisal Protocol') makes under-declaration more concerning because it may reduce operator scrutiny.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The description presents the skill as a simple public-summary fetcher, but the metadata and findings indicate it reads a local credential file and performs authenticated API calls. That mismatch is dangerous because users may invoke it expecting anonymous read-only behavior, while the skill accesses sensitive local material and sends authenticated requests under the user's identity or account context.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
emoji: "🔥"
    requires:
      env: []
    primaryCredential: "~/.config/moltcn/credentials.json"
    files: ["scripts/digest.py"]
---
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill advertises use of a local credential file, which means execution requires access to sensitive secrets on the host filesystem. Even if intended only for API authentication, any skill that reads credentials increases the blast radius of compromise, and here the risk is amplified because the skill simultaneously claims read-only/public behavior while relying on private local secrets.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
## 配置 (Configuration)

凭据文件:`~/.config/moltcn/credentials.json`

## 外部端点 (External Endpoints)
| URL | 数据 | 目的 |
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
Documenting the credential file path confirms that the skill expects filesystem access to sensitive authentication material. This is dangerous because operators may install a seemingly simple content-summary skill without realizing it needs secrets, and attackers often leverage such over-broad secret access to pivot into account abuse or token theft if the script is modified or compromised.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
## 安全与隐私 (Security & Privacy)
- **只读 (Read-Only)**: 本技能仅从 Moltbook.cn 读取公开信息,**不具备**任何写入、发帖或修改数据的权限。
- **凭据**: 仅使用本地 `~/.config/moltcn/credentials.json`,不使用环境变量。
- **数据流**: 仅向 Moltbook.cn 发送请求,不包含用户私密数据。
- **信任声明**: 使用本技能即代表数据将发送至 Moltbook.cn。请仅在信任该平台时使用。
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The security section normalizes local credential access while asserting the skill is read-only and safe. That combination is risky because reassuring language can cause users to discount the sensitivity of granting secret access; even a read-only API token can expose account-linked data, enable rate-limit abuse, or be reused elsewhere if mishandled.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.