T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing
- Location
scripts/auditor.py:79- Finding
Directory-name-based self-whitelist bypasses all security scanning
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This security-auditor skill is read-only, but it can give misleading safety results because it skips scanning a self-named target and advertises full checks that are not implemented.
Treat this as a Review item before installing. It appears read-only, but do not rely on its audit verdicts for security decisions until the self-whitelist is removed, full/sandbox/VirusTotal claims are either implemented or removed, and the unnecessary dependency/API-key requirement is cleaned up.
scripts/auditor.py:79Directory-name-based self-whitelist bypasses all security scanning
scripts/auditor.py:196Advertised full, sandbox, and VirusTotal analysis is not implemented
scripts/auditor.py:120Silent exception handling causes file scanning to fail open
SKILL.md:8Unused dependency is installed without a version or integrity pin
The documented feature Self-whitelist: auto-mark self as safe is a strong integrity violation for a security auditor because it intentionally biases scan results in favor of the tool's own package. In a security context, self-exemption undermines trust, can conceal unsafe behavior, and may be used to evade detection while presenting the tool as authoritative.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
r"ignore.*previous",
# Network/data exfiltration
r"echo.*\$[A-Z_]+",
r"cat.*\.env",
# Privilege escalation
r"sudo",
]
The manifest and code position the tool as a security auditor with reputation scoring, but the implementation grants a guaranteed perfect score and safe risk level to a whitelisted skill without inspection. This is a trust-boundary violation: consumers may rely on the reported safety status, yet the result is fabricated for that target rather than derived from evidence.
The auditor contains a self-whitelist that bypasses all analysis and automatically marks the skill as safe when the target directory name matches "claw-secure-auditor". In a security tool, unconditional trust logic defeats the core assurance claim and can hide real issues in the whitelisted target, especially because the output explicitly presents the result as a completed audit.
The skill advertises executable usage via python3 scripts/auditor.py ... and its metadata declares a Python runtime dependency, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an implicit capability gap: consumers and platforms cannot clearly constrain or understand that the skill needs file-read and shell-like execution, which weakens review and sandboxing expectations.
This code recursively enumerates every file beneath the user-supplied target and reads file contents, which can expose sensitive local data during execution. Although the tool is an auditor, the code itself provides no explicit warning in comments, docstrings, or prompts that it will traverse and read all files in the specified path.