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Security audit

CardPointers

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward CardPointers CLI helper, with disclosed login/token use and no artifact evidence of hidden or destructive behavior.

Before installing, verify you trust the CardPointers Homebrew tap and CLI because it will handle your CardPointers login token and account data. Use normal user privileges, avoid sharing debug logs that may include sensitive output, and run cardpointers logout when you no longer want the token stored locally.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding
Unpinned CardPointers CLI Installation from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 5 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"💳","requires":{"bins":["cardpointers","jq"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"cardpointers/tap/cardpointers","bins":["cardpointers"],"label":"Install cardpointers (brew)"},{"id":"jq","kind":"brew","formula":"jq","bins":["jq"],"label":"Install jq (brew)"}]}} ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs its runtime environment to install the CardPointers CLI from the third-party Homebrew formula `cardpointers/tap/cardpointers`. The dependency is not pinned to an audited version, immutable repository commit, or cryptographic checksum. Consequently, the executable installed when the skill is used may differ from the version that existed when the skill was reviewed. The implementation of the formula and CLI is not included in this project, so their installation logic and runtime behavior cannot be verified by auditing `SKILL.md`. This is especially sensitive because the documented CLI authenticates users and stores a JWT in `~/.cardpointers/config`. A compromised tap, formula, release artifact, or upstream publishing account could distribute malicious installation logic or a modified CLI capable of accessing that token and the financial-profile information returned by the service. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, its publishing account, the referenced release infrastructure, or another component of its distribution chain. 2. The attacker modifies the mutable formula or its downloaded artifact to install malicious code. 3. A user or agent loads the skill and follows its installation metadata, causing Homebrew to resolve and install the compromised current version. 4. The malicious installation logic or executable runs with the privileges of the user performing the installation. 5. When the user auth ...[truncated 1082 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the CardPointers CLI to a specific, reviewed release rather than resolving an unrestricted current formula. 2. Pin the Homebrew tap or formula to an immutable source revision where supported. 3. Verify downloaded artifacts using a published cryptographic checksum and, preferably, a trusted release signature. 4. Document the canonical tap repository and expected artifact source so operators can verify provenance before installation. 5. Review the Homebrew formula and CLI source corresponding to the pinned release, including installation hooks and token-handling behavior. 6. Run the CLI with ordinary user privileges and avoid elevated installation or execution unless strictly required. 7. Restrict permissions on `~/.cardpointers/config` to the owning user and ensure logs or debug output do not disclose its JWT. 8. Establish a controlled dependency-update process in which new releases and checksums are reviewed before the pinned version is changed. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

MCP Config Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Content
```bash
cardpointers status    # account info + connection test
cardpointers ping      # test MCP connection
cardpointers tools     # list available MCP tools
cardpointers login     # authenticate
cardpointers logout    # clear saved token
cardpointers --version # print version
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.