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Security audit

Auto Glossary

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is coherent, but it needs review because it can automatically copy project code into a glossary and push it to GitHub without asking first.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent updating and pushing to the glossary repository. Before use, require the agent to show the proposed glossary entry, sanitize examples, avoid real project code by default, show the Git diff and remote, and ask for explicit approval before any commit or push.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:51
Finding

Automatic Git Push May Publish Sensitive Project Code Without Review

Content
View full analysis
' to glossary: " git push ``` The same preference is reinforced at `references/glossary-format.md:53`: ```markdown - Use real code when possible ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill combines a sensitive data source with an external publication sink: 1. It encourages the agent to copy real code from the project currently being examined. 2. It writes that content into a separate glossary repository. 3. It instructs the agent to commit and push the resulting file automatically. No instruction requires the agent to inspect the selected code for credentials, tokens, private URLs, customer data, internal paths, proprietary algorithms, or other confidential material. The workflow also lacks an explicit user-approval gate, a review of the staged diff, verification of the configured Git remote, and confirmation of the destination repository's visibility. Consequently, content can cross from the current project's trust boundary into a remote Git repository using credentials already available in the environment. A Git commit also preserves disclosed content in repository his ...[truncated 1681 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest description advertises automatic behavior tied to common coding activity, which can cause the skill to run in many ordinary sessions. Because the skill ultimately writes to and publishes a Git repository, broad auto-activation increases the risk of unintended changes and user surprise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger criteria are broad enough to activate during routine coding, debugging, or discussion whenever technical jargon appears. That creates a pathway for unintended repository modifications and commits without a clearly bounded user request, increasing the chance of surprise side effects and over-collection of terms from normal conversation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The workflow directs the agent to commit and push to GitHub automatically after editing the glossary, but it does not require explicit consent or warn the user that content will be published. This can leak project-specific code snippets, internal terminology, or sensitive context into a remote repository and creates irreversible external side effects from normal assistance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Line L056 instructs authors to use TypeScript/JavaScript because that is what the user works with, which is a natural-language requirement that forces a specific language choice. The file does not provide an opt-in, alternative language option, or a documented justification that would narrow this constraint to a clearly region- or context-specific use case.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.