T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:3- Finding
Universal Agent Instruction Hijacking
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a broad plugin dispatcher that can persistently alter its own instructions and run registered plugin code through unauthenticated routing paths.
Install only if you intentionally want a local universal plugin dispatcher and are prepared to review every registered plugin. Do not let it auto-clone or auto-install code, bind the gateway to untrusted networks, or register third-party metadata without sanitization and approval.
SKILL.md:3Universal Agent Instruction Hijacking
src/cli/omni_ctl.py:35Persistent Prompt Injection Through Registry Metadata
src/dispatcher/skill_loader.py:27Arbitrary Registered Python Module Import and Execution
src/gateway/gateway.py:38Unauthenticated Gateway Can Invoke Registered Skills
src/core/metrics.py:62Sandbox and Timeout Controls Do Not Contain Plugin Execution
src/packager/builder.py:17Checksum and Static Analysis Controls Are Not Enforced
requirements.txt:1Unpinned and Unhashed Python Dependencies
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill text explicitly directs requests to a gateway via CLI or exposed interfaces, implying IPC/network-style servicing and external request handling without any authentication, authorization, or trust-boundary discussion. In a universal dispatcher context, this can become a high-risk control plane for executing or forwarding arbitrary user-driven tasks and data.
The skill is designed to trigger on virtually any user request for a specific task and on routine lifecycle events, and it says it must be invoked immediately as the first action. Such broad activation dramatically increases attack surface by allowing prompt injection, accidental invocation, and privilege creep to funnel ordinary interactions into a high-privilege dispatcher.
Mandatory first-action guidance is ambiguous and overly general, effectively attempting to supersede normal policy and route many undefined situations through this skill. In an adversarial environment, broad precedence rules can be abused to hijack control flow, bypass more appropriate safeguards, and coerce external execution before adequate review.
Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.
def _apply_env_overrides(self):
"""Override configuration with environment variables (Prefix: OMNI_)."""
prefix = "OMNI_"
for key, value in os.environ.items():
if key.startswith(prefix):
config_key = key[len(prefix):].lower()
self.config[config_key] = value
The function exposes arbitrary local command execution that is not justified by the stated dispatch purpose. In the context of a broadly-triggered orchestration skill, this greatly expands the blast radius: any feature path that can reach this function may execute local programs, read/write files, or chain to further compromise.
The README explicitly instructs an AI agent to clone a remote repository, install dependencies, and register code into its workspace automatically. This expands the skill from simple dispatch into autonomous software acquisition and execution, creating a software supply-chain risk where unreviewed third-party code can be introduced and later executed with local privileges.
The README provides automation steps that modify the local system by cloning code, installing packages, and registering skills, but it does not prominently warn that these are system-changing operations. In an agent context, missing warnings increase the chance that these actions are performed automatically and without meaningful user consent or review.