T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:81- Finding
Mutable Remote Executable Installed Without Independent Authenticity Verification
- Content
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__.tar.gz -o seerr-cli.tar.gz curl -fsSL https://github.com/electather/seerr-cli/releases/latest/download/seerr-cli__checksums.txt -o checksums.txt grep seerr-cli___.tar.gz checksums.txt | sha256sum -c tar -xzf seerr-cli.tar.gz sudo mv seerr-cli /usr/local/bin/ ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs users to download an executable archive from a personal GitHub repository, extract it, and install the resulting binary into a system-wide executable directory. Retrieving the CLI is necessary for the declared functionality. However, the effective executable payload is not contained in the reviewed Skill and can change after the Skill has been audited. The archive and checksum are both obtained from the same publisher and mutable release channel. If the publisher account or release process is compromised, an attacker can replace both the executable archive and its checksum. The checksum therefore verifies download integrity but does not independently establish publisher authenticity. The use of the `latest` release path further weakens reproducibility because it does not pin installation to a release whose digest was reviewed independently. The project contains no source code, trusted public signing key, pinned digest, or provenance information with which to validate the downloaded executable. Installing the binary under `/usr/local/bin` using `sudo` also exceeds the minimum privileges required to run a user-level CLI. Although the downloaded binary is not executed by `sudo` in the shown commands, system-wide placement causes it to become available through the normal executable search path. ### Attack Path 1. ...[truncated 1419 chars]- Remediation
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