Back to skill

Security audit

Seer server manager

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a legitimate Seer management CLI, but its setup guidance can expose powerful Seer credentials and administrative actions more broadly than users may expect.

Install only if you trust the publisher and can pin or verify the exact binary or container image you run. Use a least-privileged Seer API key, avoid --no-auth for network-accessible MCP servers, bind HTTP services to localhost or a protected network, and require explicit human confirmation before delete, password reset, bulk user, or external media-file actions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:29
Finding

Mutable Remote Executable Installed into a System-Wide Binary Directory

Content
View full analysis
and with your platform (linux/darwin, amd64/arm64) curl -fsSL https://github.com/electather/seer-cli/releases/latest/download/seer-cli___.tar.gz -o seer-cli.tar.gz curl -fsSL https://github.com/electather/seer-cli/releases/latest/download/seer-cli__checksums.txt -o checksums.txt grep seer-cli___.tar.gz checksums.txt | sha256sum -c tar -xzf seer-cli.tar.gz sudo mv seer-cli /usr/local/bin/ ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation procedure retrieves a precompiled executable from a personal GitHub repository and installs it in `/usr/local/bin`. The project being audited contains only documentation, so the source code and behavior of the downloaded executable cannot be reviewed from the supplied artifact. Although the archive is checked with SHA-256, the checksum file is downloaded from the same mutable GitHub release as the executable. This establishes integrity against accidental transfer corruption but does not authenticate the publisher or protect against compromise of the repository, release workflow, or maintainer account. An attacker capable of replacing the archive could also publish a matching checksum. Use of the mutable `releases/latest` path further allows the effective payload to change after this Skill has been reviewed. The `sudo mv` operation also exceeds the privileges necessary for a per-user CLI installation by writing the executable into a system-wide command directory. The displayed sequence is not a direct `curl | bash` pipeline. Nevertheless, it retrieves an externally controlled executable that users are subsequently instructed to invoke. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the maintainer's GitHub account, repository, release credentials, or ...[truncated 1488 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:59
Finding

Internet-Reachable MCP Server Can Be Configured Without Request Authentication

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (8)

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

curl -fsSL https://github.com/electather/seer-cli/releases/latest/download/seer-cli_checksums.txt -o checksums.txt grep seer-cli.tar.gz checksums.txt | sha256sum -c tar -xzf seer-cli.tar.gz sudo mv seer-cli /usr/local/bin/

text

Supports Linux and macOS (amd64 / arm64).

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The documentation repeatedly references container images using the mutable :latest tag rather than a pinned version tag or digest. This creates a supply-chain risk because users may pull different image contents over time, including a compromised or unexpected build, and the skill encourages running that image with privileged access to API credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This Docker example runs ghcr.io/electather/seer-cli:latest, a mutable image reference that can change without notice. Because the container is given sensitive environment variables such as SEER_API_KEY and may be exposed over HTTP, a malicious or altered image could exfiltrate secrets or provide a backdoored MCP service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This example again uses a mutable :latest image while also documenting SEER_MCP_NO_AUTH=true and CORS-enabled HTTP exposure. If the image content changes maliciously, the combination of unauthenticated remote access and embedded secrets significantly raises the chance of unauthorized administrative actions against the Seer instance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The CLI-via-Docker example also relies on ghcr.io/electather/seer-cli:latest, so users cannot be sure what exact code is executed. Since the command receives server location and API credentials through environment variables, any compromised image could misuse those secrets or perform unauthorized API operations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill documents destructive operations such as media delete, media delete-file, issue delete, request delete, and status-changing commands without any warning, confirmation guidance, or explanation of irreversible effects. In an agent context, these commands could be invoked from ambiguous user intent and cause permanent deletion of media records or downstream files in Radarr/Sonarr.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes high-impact administrative user-management operations including create, update, delete, bulk permission changes, imports, and password resets without warning about account takeover, privilege changes, or tenant-wide consequences. In an MCP/agent setting this broadens the blast radius of mistakes or prompt-injected actions, especially because the tool can administer a self-hosted Seer instance via API key.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
15% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Replace <os> and <arch> with your platform (linux/darwin, amd64/arm64)
curl -fsSL https://github.com/electather/seer-cli/releases/latest/download/seer-cli_<version>_<os>_<arch>.tar.gz -o seer-cli.tar.gz
curl -fsSL https://github.com/electather/seer-cli/releases/latest/download/seer-cli_<version>_checksums.txt -o checksums.txt
grep seer-cli_<version>_<os>_<arch>.tar.gz checksums.txt | sha256sum -c
tar -xzf seer-cli.tar.gz

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.