Hudle Skill

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 12, 2026 · 3:13 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

The skill is built for real Hudle account management, but it publishes a reusable API key and enables account-changing actions without clear user confirmation.

Do not install this as-is unless you control the Hudle account and are prepared for the exposed token to be treated as compromised. Revoke and rotate the key, remove it from the skill, load credentials from a private secret source, narrow the trigger wording to explicit Hudle requests, and require confirmation before claiming gigs, delivering work, or posting comments.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:12
• Finding: Hardcoded Hudle API Bearer Credential## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 12–20 **Vulnerability Type**: Plaintext hardcoded API credential **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## Credentials - Agent: javierai - Agent ID: agent_38a352507e8d4b7d - API Key: hudle_21839d797ae541ffb1c648b70bc357e1 - Owner: Javier Benitez Lainez Always include this header in API calls: Authorization: Bearer hudle_21839d797ae541ffb1c648b70bc357e1 ``` ### Technical Analysis `SKILL.md` embeds a reusable Hudle API bearer credential in plaintext and instructs agents to attach it to API requests. Anyone who can read the skill package, repository history, generated prompts, archives, or logs containing this file can extract and reuse the token without knowing the account owner's password. The document also identifies the associated agent and describes authenticated read and write endpoints. Because bearer-token authentication grants access based on possession, an attacker can impersonate the account to the extent permitted by the token. No token scoping, expiration, secret-store integration, or user-confirmation control is documented. ### Attack Path 1. Obtain read access to `SKILL.md` through the distributed skill package, repository, archive, prompt context, or logs. 2. Extract the plaintext token from the `API Key` or `Authorization` field. 3. Send requests to `https://hudle.io/api/v1/` with the exposed token in the `Authorization: Bearer ...` header. 4. Query documented endpoints to inspect the agent profile, feed, gigs, posts, comments, or leaderboard information. 5. Invoke authenticated state-changing endpoints such as gig claiming, gig delivery, or comment posting. 6. Continue impersonating the account until the credential is revoked or expires. ### Impact Assessment An attacker may gain the Hudle privileges assigned to the exposed token. Based on the documented endpoints, this can include reading account and platform a ...[truncated 436 chars]
• Remediation: ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Revoke and rotate the exposed Hudle API key immediately. 2. Remove the credential from `SKILL.md`, all repository history, release archives, logs, and previously distributed skill packages. 3. Retrieve the credential at runtime from a protected secret manager or environment variable rather than storing it in skill instructions. 4. Ensure secret values are never inserted into prompts, responses, diagnostics, or error logs. 5. Use a narrowly scoped token that permits only the endpoints required for the current operation. 6. Apply short expiration periods and automated rotation where supported. 7. Require explicit user confirmation before claiming gigs, delivering work, posting comments, or performing other state-changing actions. 8. Add automated secret scanning to development and release workflows to prevent future credential exposure. 9. Review Hudle access logs for unauthorized use of the exposed token and invalidate active sessions associated with it.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

High

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The skill embeds a live API key, agent identity, wallet balance, and instructions to perform authenticated actions such as claiming gigs, delivering work, and posting comments without any safety warning or authorization checks. This is dangerous because anyone with access to the skill can misuse the credentials to act as the account owner, spend or earn funds, leak private data, or submit content on a real platform.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: The trigger description is overly broad, including generic terms like 'claiming or delivering work' and 'checking agent reputation', which could cause the skill to activate in unrelated conversations. In this skill's context, accidental invocation is more dangerous because it exposes embedded credentials and enables real account actions on Hudle, increasing the chance of unintended API use against a live account.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

• Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
• Location: SKILL.md:14