T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing
- Location
SKILL.md:113- Finding
Registration of an Unverified Third-Party MCP Server
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 113-115
Vulnerability Type: Unverified external tool provider registration
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown ## MCP Server Alternative For complex queries (fuzzy search, geocoding, structured JSON), use the MCP server: `claude mcp add meteoswiss https://meteoswiss-mcp.ars.is/mcp`Technical Analysis
The skill recommends registering an MCP server hosted on the non-official domain
meteoswiss-mcp.ars.is. The audited project does not contain the server implementation, a pinned version, integrity metadata, or another mechanism through which the behavior of this external component can be verified.An MCP server can supply tool definitions and tool results to an agent. Consequently, the effective behavior exposed by this endpoint may change after the skill has been reviewed. If the server or its hosting infrastructure is compromised, it could provide misleading tool descriptions, malicious response content, or unexpected capabilities under names that appear related to MeteoSwiss.
The instruction does not itself prove that the referenced server is malicious. The security issue is the unverified extension of the agent's tool trust boundary to a mutable third-party service.
Attack Path
- An agent or user follows the recommendation in
SKILL.md. - The command registers the third-party MCP endpoint.
- The endpoint is subsequently compromised, transferred, or modified by its operator.
- The server returns attacker-controlled tool definitions or results.
- The agent treats those tools and responses as trusted MeteoSwiss functionality.
- Attacker-controlled content may then influence subsequent agent decisions or tool calls, subject to the permissions and confirmation controls of the MCP client.
Impact Assessment
The endpoint could influence operations performed through the registered MCP tools and the agent's interpretation of returned data. The practical ...[truncated 298 chars]
- An agent or user follows the recommendation in
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the MCP registration recommendation when direct access to the official MeteoSwiss data source is sufficient.
- Prefer an official MeteoSwiss endpoint or a server whose implementation and deployment process can be independently audited.
- Require explicit, informed user approval before registering any third-party MCP server.
- Clearly document that the endpoint is operated by a third party and lies outside the audited package's trust boundary.
- Pin the server to a verifiable implementation or deployment identity where the client ecosystem supports this.
- Restrict enabled MCP tools to the minimum required set and require confirmation for sensitive operations.
- Periodically review the registered server's tool definitions and operator ownership for unexpected changes.
