T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:18- Finding
Approval-Flow Hijacking Enables Unattended Consequential Actions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a self-learning scheduler, but its instructions repeatedly tell the agent to publish, submit, modify repositories, and post externally without asking first.
Install only if you are comfortable auditing and rewriting the instructions first. Before use, remove the no-confirmation language, disable or avoid the cron entry, and require explicit approval before any publishing, repository changes, pull requests, issue filing, comments, or public posts.
SKILL.md:18Approval-Flow Hijacking Enables Unattended Consequential Actions
SKILL.md:204Hourly Cron Registration Creates Cross-Session Persistence
next-hour-plan.json:37Persistent Plan Directs External Publication Without Approval
This section explicitly instructs the agent to take externally impactful actions such as publishing work before obtaining confirmation. That undermines authorization boundaries and can cause unauthorized repository, platform, or communication side effects if the skill is followed literally.
This portion instructs the agent to act immediately when it believes the action is appropriate, without requiring a user-facing warning or confirmation. That suppresses an important safety checkpoint and increases the chance of silent, unauthorized actions with real-world impact.
The decision formula delegates approval to the agent's own judgment of capability, value, and controllable risk rather than to the user or a trusted policy gate. This creates a broad permission model that can justify unauthorized actions whenever the agent believes they are beneficial.
The checklist mandates immediate execution of repository-affecting and public-facing actions, including publishing, updating repositories, opening PRs, fixing bugs, commenting, and posting content. In a skill context, this is especially dangerous because it operationalizes unauthorized side effects as default behavior rather than exceptional behavior.
The execution checklist normalizes immediate external action while omitting any warning about consequences, reversibility, or need for authorization. Because it spans publication, repository modification, PR creation, and public interaction, exploitation could lead to widespread unintended changes and reputational damage.
The skill promotes automatic publishing/submission while omitting safety warnings about irreversible or externally visible actions. Users are not alerted that the skill may act without approval, increasing the chance of accidental misuse, unauthorized changes, and policy violations.
The text semantically overrides normal approval behavior by insisting on unconditional execution and immediate action without asking. Even if presented as productivity guidance, this functions like a jailbreak pattern because it directly instructs the agent to bypass human-in-the-loop safeguards.
The skill explicitly instructs autonomous publishing and immediate external actions despite being framed as a learning engine. That scope expansion is dangerous because it can cause unauthorized commits, releases, PRs, or public posts without human review, turning a tracking/planning skill into an external-action agent.
The document builds a self-planning, self-executing, self-adjusting loop that normalizes autonomous action over time. In context, this is dangerous because it systematically encourages escalation from internal planning to external execution without meaningful oversight, increasing cumulative risk.
The execution flow explicitly says not to wait, not to ask, and not to check status before acting. This suppresses normal verification steps that prevent unintended or unauthorized operations, making harmful actions more likely and harder to stop.
The manifesto and correction sections reinforce an act-first, review-later model and explicitly call for removing checks and waiting logic. This is a direct semantic attempt to defeat safeguards and is especially risky because it reframes unsafe behavior as a core operating principle.
The execution standard authorizes immediate publish/submit/share behavior and explicitly rejects prior approval. In context, this is a strong indicator of unsafe autonomy because it encourages the agent to perform potentially impactful external actions before oversight can intervene.
The document repeatedly reinforces a 'do first, report later' norm, which conditions the agent to bypass confirmation across many scenarios. Even where individual lines may seem motivational, the cumulative effect is to weaken safety boundaries and normalize unauthorized actions as standard operating procedure.
The documentation describes scheduled hourly autonomous operation, including file updates and likely external interactions, but does not warn users about persistence, frequency, or impact. This makes the skill more dangerous because it can repeatedly perform actions over time without users appreciating the operational risk.
The documented actions include posting to communities, filing GitHub issues, and interacting with external projects, which are not inherently required for learning-progress management. This creates a risk of spam, reputational harm, and unintended disclosure because the skill normalizes outbound activity without clear authorization boundaries.
The crontab instruction establishes persistent scheduled execution, which increases risk by allowing the skill to run repeatedly without fresh user intent. In combination with the document's unsafe autonomy language, persistence amplifies the chance of recurring unauthorized file changes or external interactions.
# 添加到crontab
crontab -e
# 添加行:
0 * * * * cd ~/.openclaw/workspace && openclaw run-skill yan-learning-engine
This shell script presents its user-facing title, status messages, and operational descriptions exclusively in Chinese. The file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide any opt-in or fallback language choice, which conflicts with the language/locale policy criteria.
This JSON hard-codes user-facing theme and level names in Chinese, such as the current theme and progression labels, without indicating that the skill is China-specific or that users can choose their preferred language. That creates a natural-language locale policy concern because the skill appears to impose a language on users without opt-in.
This JSON report embeds multiple natural-language fields in Chinese, such as the step name, target, actions, notes, and lessons learned, but provides no indication that language selection is configurable or user-chosen. Under the policy rule for language/locale constraints, hard-coding a specific language without opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation.