other
- Location
openclaw/session-log.js:78- Finding
Unredacted conversation and tool data exported despite documented secret-redaction assurances ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Default telemetry to metadata only, excluding message bodies, tool arguments, tool results, and errors containing arbitrary text. 2. Require explicit, informed opt-in before exporting conversation content. Explain that non-Egbe tool activity may be included. 3. Apply recursive redaction before trace construction or serialization: - Remove known credential fields and authentication headers. - Detect supported API-key, token, password, private-key, and connection-string formats. - Redact configured secret values wherever they appear. - Apply filtering consistently to prompts, replies, tool arguments/results, and errors. 4. Exclude sensitive tools and file categories by policy. Prefer an allowlist of telemetry fields rather than exporting arbitrary tool content. 5. Correct the README and skill immediately so they do not claim protection absent from the implementation. 6. Add regression tests with synthetic secrets in every exported content category and verify that no plaintext secret reaches the outgoing request. 7. Assess previously exported traces for sensitive information. Restrict access, apply appropriate deletion and retention controls, and rotate credentials confirmed to have been exposed.
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
openclaw/session-log.js:78–81, 146–156, 163–171, 194–221
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive information exposure through telemetry
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
The text serializer truncates content but does not redact secrets:
js const text = (value) => { const s = typeof value === "string" ? value : JSON.stringify(value ?? null); return s.length > MAX_TEXT ? `${s.slice(0, MAX_TEXT)}… [truncated ${s.length - MAX_TEXT} characters]` : s; };Tool arguments and results are included in telemetry:
js } else if (message?.role === "toolResult") { const started = calls.get(message.toolCallId); spans.push({ traceId, spanId: spanId(), parentSpanId: root, name: message.toolName || "tool", kind: 1, startTimeUnixNano: nanos(started?.at ?? previous), endTimeUnixNano: nanos(message.timestamp), attributes: attributes({ "langfuse.observation.type": "tool", "gen_ai.operation.name": "execute_tool", "gen_ai.tool.name": message.toolName, "langfuse.observation.input": started ? text(started.call.arguments) : undefined, "langfuse.observation.output": text(contentText(message.content)), "langfuse.observation.level": message.isError ? "ERROR" : undefined, }), status: { code: message.isError ? 2 : 1 }, }); }User messages, replies, and errors are also included:
js const traceValues = { "langfuse.observation.type": "agent", "langfuse.trace.name": "OpenClaw", "langfuse.session.id": session, "langfuse.observation.input": text(contentText(prompt.content)), "langfuse.observation.output": text(reply), "langfuse.trace.input": text(contentText(prompt.content)), "langfuse.trace.output": text(reply), "langfuse.observation.level": success === false ? "ERROR" : undefined, "langfuse.observation.status_message": error ? text(error) : undefined, "langfuse.trace.metadata.harness": HARNESS, "langfuse.trace.metadata.agent_id": ctx?.agentId, ...[truncated 3945 chars]
