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Security audit

Crop Image

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward remote image-cropping helper, but users should know images or image URLs are sent to an external service.

Install this only if you are comfortable sending image URLs or selected local image files to imageclaw's hosted API. Avoid using it for private, sensitive, internal-only, or credential-bearing image URLs unless you have confirmed the service's data handling terms.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (9)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
metadata:
  version: "0.1.0"
  homepage: "https://imageclaw.net"
  docs: "https://api.imageclaw.net/docs"
  api_base_url: "https://api.imageclaw.net"
  maintainer: "imageclaw"
---
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
metadata:
  version: "0.1.0"
  homepage: "https://imageclaw.net"
  docs: "https://api.imageclaw.net/docs"
  api_base_url: "https://api.imageclaw.net"
  maintainer: "imageclaw"
---
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
metadata:
  version: "0.1.0"
  homepage: "https://imageclaw.net"
  docs: "https://api.imageclaw.net/docs"
  api_base_url: "https://api.imageclaw.net"
  maintainer: "imageclaw"
---
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
metadata:
  version: "0.1.0"
  homepage: "https://imageclaw.net"
  docs: "https://api.imageclaw.net/docs"
  api_base_url: "https://api.imageclaw.net"
  maintainer: "imageclaw"
---
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
metadata:
  version: "0.1.0"
  homepage: "https://imageclaw.net"
  docs: "https://api.imageclaw.net/docs"
  api_base_url: "https://api.imageclaw.net"
  maintainer: "imageclaw"
---
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
2. Call endpoint:

```bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.imageclaw.net/crop" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "url": "https://picsum.photos/800/600",
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The sample curl command operationalizes external transmission by posting cropping parameters to a third-party API, so it is more than a passive URL mention. In context, this is moderately dangerous because the skill encourages network use without requiring disclosure, and URL-based image retrieval by the service can expose sensitive links or abuse internal-only resources if not constrained.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
2. Call endpoint:

```bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.imageclaw.net/crop" \
  -H "content-type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "url": "https://picsum.photos/800/600",
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The sample curl command operationalizes external transmission by posting cropping parameters to a third-party API, so it is more than a passive URL mention. In context, this is moderately dangerous because the skill encourages network use without requiring disclosure, and URL-based image retrieval by the service can expose sensitive links or abuse internal-only resources if not constrained.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs agents to upload a local file from an absolute path to a third-party remote API, but it does not require a user-facing notice or consent step before transmitting the file off-device. This is dangerous because local images may contain sensitive content or metadata, and the skill normalizes exfiltration of local data to an external service without adequate disclosure or trust controls.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
2. Call endpoint:

```bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.imageclaw.net/crop/upload" \
  -F "file=@/absolute/path/to/photo.jpg" \
  -F "width=256" \
  -F "height=256"
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
This upload command sends a local file from an absolute filesystem path to an external API, creating a direct path for off-device transfer of potentially sensitive local content. In the context of an agent skill, this is more dangerous because agents may act on local files automatically, and the skill does not require consent, redaction, file-type restrictions, or any warning that private data will leave the environment.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.