T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- README.md:17
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md:17-19`; duplicated in `SKILL.md:32-34` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned and unverifiable third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code `README.md:17-19`: ```bash pip install rtk-compressor ``` `SKILL.md:32-34`: ```bash pip install rtk-compressor ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions retrieve the latest available `rtk-compressor` release from PyPI without pinning an exact version or verifying package hashes. The audited artifact contains only documentation and metadata; it does not include the package implementation needed to verify the installed code's behavior. Consequently, the effective code installed by users can change after this skill artifact has been reviewed. Python package installation can execute package-controlled build or installation logic, and the installed application subsequently processes potentially sensitive command output and file contents. This finding does not establish that the current PyPI package is malicious. The security issue is that the instructions establish no reproducible or integrity-verified dependency boundary. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher account, package repository, build pipeline, or another relevant distribution component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious or compromised release under the expected package name. 3. A user follows the documented `pip install rtk-compressor` instruction. 4. `pip` resolves and downloads the mutable package release without checking a project-supplied version constraint or cryptographic hash. 5. Package-controlled code executes during installation, import, or later CLI use with the privileges of the installing user. 6. The malicious code can access data available to that user, including command output or files passed to the compressor. ### Impact Assessment Successful supply-chain compromise could result in arbitrary code execution with the ...[truncated 506 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the dependency to a specifically reviewed version, for example: ```bash python3 -m pip install "rtk-compressor==<reviewed-version>" ``` 2. Publish cryptographic hashes for the approved distribution artifacts and use a hash-locked requirements file: ```text rtk-compressor==<reviewed-version> \ --hash=sha256:<verified-wheel-hash> ``` Install it with: ```bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Include the skill's implementation or a verifiable source reference in the artifact so auditors can review the code users will execute. 4. Document the authoritative source repository, expected PyPI publisher, release-signing process, and procedure for verifying downloaded artifacts. 5. Recommend installation in an isolated virtual environment under a non-privileged account. Explicitly warn users not to run the installation with `sudo` or unnecessary administrative privileges. 6. Keep the installation and executable names consistent. `SKILL.md` references `rtk-compressor`, while `README.md` references `rtk-compress`; verify and document the legitimate executable name to reduce confusion and accidental invocation of an unrelated local command. ]]>