T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:16- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependencies
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 16–41
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by unpinned dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
json "install": [ { "id": "pip", "kind": "pip", "package": "requests-html", "label": "Install requests-html (for JavaScript rendering)" }, { "id": "pip", "kind": "pip", "package": "beautifulsoup4", "label": "Install beautifulsoup4" }, { "id": "pip", "kind": "pip", "package": "fpdf2", "label": "Install fpdf2 (for PDF generation with Chinese support)" }, { "id": "pip", "kind": "pip", "package": "reportlab", "label": "Install reportlab (fallback PDF generation)" } ]Technical Analysis
The installation metadata specifies package names without exact versions or integrity hashes. Consequently, installation results depend on whichever package releases the configured Python package index serves at installation time.
This creates a supply-chain exposure because the code reviewed during this audit does not fully define the code that will ultimately be installed and executed. If a dependency release, maintainer account, distribution artifact, or package index is compromised, malicious package installation hooks or import-time code could execute within the Skill's runtime environment.
No evidence was found that the listed package names are typosquatted or currently malicious. The finding concerns the absence of reproducible version and integrity controls.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises a listed dependency's publishing account, release process, distribution artifact, or package index.
- The attacker publishes a malicious release under the legitimate package name.
- A user installs the Skill dependencies from the unconstrained package declarations. 4 ...[truncated 887 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than allowing unconstrained resolution.
- Maintain a lock file generated from a controlled environment and review dependency changes before updating it.
- Require cryptographic hashes for downloaded distributions, such as with
pip install --require-hashes. - Configure an explicit trusted package index or an internally controlled package mirror.
- Prefer reviewed wheel artifacts and disable source builds where operationally feasible.
- Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning to the release process.
- Remove
reportlabfrom the installation list if it is not actually used as a fallback, thereby reducing supply-chain exposure.