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Security audit

Book Yoga

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward yoga-booking connector to Lokuli, with privacy and confirmation caveats but no evidence of hidden or harmful behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli’s external service to search for and book yoga. Before creating a booking, confirm the provider, service, date, time, name, email, and phone number, and avoid sharing unnecessary personal information.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The trigger text is broad enough to activate on generic yoga-related requests without clear boundaries, which can cause the agent to invoke an external booking workflow when the user may only be seeking information. In this skill context, that increases the chance of unintended use of a third-party MCP endpoint and downstream collection or transmission of user data.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill collects and sends personal data such as name, email, and phone number to an external service, but the documentation provides no user-facing warning or consent step. In a booking skill, this omission is especially risky because users may not realize their PII is being transmitted off-platform to Lokuli.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.