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Security audit

Book Salon

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward salon-booking skill that uses an external Lokuli booking endpoint, with privacy and confirmation steps the user should manage carefully.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli for salon booking. Before creating an appointment, confirm the salon, service, time, and the exact name, email, and phone number your agent will send.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill description triggers on broad phrases like 'find salon near me' or 'any salon service request', which can cause the agent to invoke this external booking skill in situations where the user only wants information rather than to contact a third-party service. Overbroad invocation increases the chance of unnecessary external calls and premature progression toward booking workflows that may involve location or personal data.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The create_booking example includes customer name, email, and phone number being sent to a third-party MCP endpoint, but the skill documentation provides no warning or consent requirement before transmitting this personal data. In a booking context this is especially risky because users may not realize their PII is leaving the agent environment and being shared with an external service.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.