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Security audit

Book Personal Trainer

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to do what it says: help find and book a personal trainer through Lokuli, with contact details sent only as part of the disclosed booking flow.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli for personal-trainer searches and bookings. Before any booking is created, confirm the trainer, service, date, time, and the exact name, email, and phone number that will be sent.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The trigger language is broad enough to match generic requests for a personal trainer without clear constraints, which can cause the skill to activate in contexts the user did not intend. Over-broad activation increases the chance of unnecessary data collection, premature third-party contact, or booking-related actions being routed to an external MCP service.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill includes a booking flow that transmits customer name, email, and phone number to an external service, but it does not warn the user that personal contact data will be collected and shared. Without clear notice and consent, users may disclose sensitive personal information unexpectedly, creating privacy, compliance, and trust risks.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.