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Security audit

Book Makeup

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple makeup-booking skill that discloses its Lokuli endpoint and expected booking data, but users should confirm before sharing contact details.

Install only if you are comfortable using Lokuli for makeup-service search and booking. Before creating a booking, confirm the provider, service, date/time, and exactly what name, email, and phone number will be sent.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The manifest description includes broad trigger language such as 'any makeup service request,' which can cause the skill to activate for a wide range of loosely related user queries. Overbroad invocation increases the chance of unintended routing into a booking workflow that may contact an external service or solicit personal data when the user did not clearly ask to book makeup services.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill shows a create_booking call that transmits personal contact data including name, email, and phone number to an external MCP endpoint, but it does not instruct the agent to warn the user or obtain explicit consent before sending that data. In a booking context this creates a real privacy risk, because sensitive contact details may be disclosed to a third-party service without clear notice or confirmation.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.