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Security audit

Book Extensions

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to do what it says: help book extension appointments through an external booking service, with no evidence of hidden or unrelated behavior.

Install only if you intend to use Lokuli's external booking service. Before creating a booking, confirm the appointment details and be comfortable sharing the customer's name, email, and phone with that service.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The trigger language is broad enough to match ambiguous requests involving 'extensions,' which could refer to unrelated domains such as browser extensions, file extensions, or hair extensions without clear user intent to book a service. This can cause the skill to activate in the wrong context and potentially steer the agent into external search or booking flows the user did not mean to invoke.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill describes booking through an external MCP endpoint and includes fields for customer name, email, and phone, but does not warn that this personal data will be transmitted off-platform to a third-party service. Without explicit notice and consent, users may unknowingly disclose sensitive contact information to an external system.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.