Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This brake-service booking skill is mostly coherent, but it can create a third-party booking while sending a user's name, email, and phone number without explicit consent guidance.
Review before installing. The skill is not malicious, but users should expect queries and booking details to go to Lokuli's MCP service, and should only proceed after confirming the provider, time slot, and personal contact details to be shared.
The trigger language is broad enough to activate on generic brake-service-related requests without clearly constraining scope or confirming user intent. In a booking skill that can progress toward third-party actions, overbroad activation increases the chance of unintended invocation and unnecessary data collection or transaction flow initiation.
The skill includes a booking flow that collects and transmits personal contact information to an external MCP endpoint, but it provides no user-facing warning or consent language about sharing name, email, and phone number with a third party. This creates privacy and trust risks because users may not understand that their personal data will be sent off-platform to complete the booking.
No suspicious patterns detected.
